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EXCERPT FROM OIL CAPITAL: THE HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN OIL, WILDCATTERS, 
INDEPENDENTS AND THEIR BANKERS* 
BERNARD F. CLARK, JR.** 
 
CHAPTER 8: THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
“It must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative 
destruction . . . .” 
—Joseph Schumpeter 
 
The arrival of the new millennium brought a collective sigh of relief for 
borrowers and lenders alike, as computer clocks rolled over from ’99 to ’00 
and a feared, computer-code-based collapse of digital systems failed to 
materialize. After all of the hoopla, the New Year arrived with a yawn.  
The affirmative covenants that crept into loan agreements near the end of 
the 1990s, requiring that “the Borrower shall take all steps necessary to 
protect against Y2K” were quickly removed.855 More importantly, the 
                                                                                                                 
 * Pagination in this excerpt has been altered from the original book pagination.  This 
material begins at page 311 in the book. 
 ** Bernard F. (Buddy) Clark, Jr. grew up in Houston, Texas, well aware of the needs 
producers face for capital. As chief financial officer for Mitchell Energy & Development 
Corp. for 45 years, his father was often flying to New York and Chicago to meet with 
commercial and investment bankers for funds to finance Mitchell Energy’s constant need of 
capital. 
 855. Typical language for the borrower’s representation included “Year 2000 Matters.” 
“In order to avoid a material adverse effect on the Borrower and its Subsidiaries taken as a 
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industry was ready to put the bad memories of the prior couple of years 
behind them and start the year and century anew.  
In the early part of the decade, new loan-agreement clauses were needed 
and additional forms required after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. 
Congress responded to the attacks by enacting certain anti-terrorism laws, 
including the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, known in 
short as the USA Patriot Act.856 Among many other things, the added 
language to credit agreements required greater disclosures by borrowers 
and Know Your Customer (KYC) forms, aimed at deterring money 
laundering and terrorist financing. 857 
Rising oil and gas prices were welcomed relief from the punishing prices 
of the end of the 1990s that had crippled many producers or caused them to 
merge with larger companies. Natural gas rose from less than $2 in the 
summer of 1998 to between $2.60 and $3.80 during the first six months of 
2000 and stretched to $6.80 in January of 2001.858  
The rig count for drilling gas wells increased from fewer than 400 to 
almost 900 by the beginning of 2001.859 But the increase in activity was not 
producing twice as much gas. In fact, total U.S. gas production was roughly 
unchanged.860  
Conventional wisdom was that, with the application of 3-D seismic 
technology, most of the easy gas had been found and developed. As a 
result, it became necessary to tap smaller and deeper targets onshore and in 
                                                                                                                 
whole, any reprogramming required to permit the proper functioning in all material respects 
(but only to the extent that such proper functioning would otherwise be impaired by the 
occurrence of the year 2000) in and following the year 2000, of computer systems and other 
equipment containing embedded microchips, in either case owned or operated by Borrower 
or any Subsidiaries or used or relied upon in the conduct of their business (including, to the 
Borrower’s knowledge, any such systems and other equipment supplied by others or with 
which the computer systems of Borrower or any of its Subsidiaries interface), and the testing 
of all such systems and other equipment as so reprogrammed, will be completed by 
December 31, 1999.”  
 856. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. 
 857. Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering, 31 U.S.C. 5318(i) effective July 23, 
2002. 
 858. U.S. EIA, Independent Statistics & Analysis. “U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price.” 
Accessed March 01, 2016. Eia.gov. 
 859. There were 371 rotary rigs drilling for natural gas in April, 1999, and 871 in 
January, 2001. U.S. EIA, Independent Statistics & Analysis. “U.S. Natural Gas Rotary Rigs 
in Operation.” Accessed March 6, 2016. Eia.gov. 
 860. U.S. gas production was 18.8 Tcf in 1999; in 2001, 19.6 Tcf. U.S. EIA, Independent 
Statistics & Analysis. “U.S. Dry Natural Gas Production.” Accessed March 6, 2016. Eia.gov. 
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the Gulf for which decline rates were high, especially as extraction 
techniques were improving concurrently.  
At the same time, U.S. power producers were bringing more gas-fired 
power plants online, increasing demand.861 The result was a treadmill in 
which, despite dramatic increases in drilling, the industry was unable to 
significantly increase supply. The risk was that rising prices would drive the 
most price-sensitive users out of the market, thus resulting in demand 
destruction. 
Meanwhile, WTI, which hit a nadir of less than $11 in December of 
1998, began what would become a long 10-year path to just shy of $150 in 
July of 2008. Also, independents and their bankers were encouraged that 
Texas-oil-patch-grown George W. Bush was elected the U.S.’ 43rd 
president and took office in January of 2001. The son of President George 
H.W. Bush, “43” grew up in Midland and Houston and had been a 
wildcatter with Arbusto Energy Co., Spectrum 7 Co. and Harken Energy 
Corp. in the 1970s and into the early 1990s.  
Moreover, Vice President Dick Cheney had most recently served as 
chairman and CEO of oilfield-services giant Halliburton Co. With the dot-
com bust and rising oil and gas prices, capital began flowing to energy 
companies and they and their investors took heart that new, higher price 
floors were sustainable.  
Despite the good news on the price front, traditional reserve-based 
lending markets failed to see any significant increase in loan volume.862 
Producers had not forgotten that, in the first quarter of 1999, following 
banks’ reset of their price decks, many of them had greater amounts drawn 
on their revolvers than their revised borrowing bases. The sting of this 
borrowing-base deficit was still fresh in the minds of many producers as 
they entered the new millennium.  
U.S. capital markets were still recovering from the Asian contagion and 
the dot-com hangover; however, producers were wary of spending beyond 
their means. Increasing oil and gas prices were a double-edged sword for 
those looking to grow through acquisitions. They had stronger cash flows 
and more asset value to borrow against. But they had to convince their 
brethren, who were also enjoying improved cash flows, to sell at current 
prices rather than hold out for, perhaps, higher prices in the near future.  
                                                                                                                 
 861. U.S. natural gas demand for power generation increased from 4.6 Tcf in 1998 to 5.7 
Tcf in 2002. U.S. EIA, Independent Statistics & Analysis. “U.S. Natural Gas Deliveries to 
Electric Power Consumers.” Accessed March 6, 2016. Eia.gov. 
 862. Brian A. Toal, “Big Deals,” Here’s the Money: Capital Formation 2004, Special 
Supplement to Oil and Gas Investor, May 2004, 5. 
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On the banking side, some of the major energy lenders were 
consolidating. With the money-center mega-mergers, only half as many 
energy lenders were around in 2002 as five years prior. NationsBank 
merged with Bank of America in 1998, Deutsche Bank and Bankers Trust 
in 1999, Chase Manhattan with JPMorgan in December 2000 and First 
Union with Wachovia Bank in 2001, to name a few.  
The mergers left many medium and small independents either squeezed 
out of their bank or shuffled up to New York offices when they would have 
preferred local account management. “What’s more, the remaining giants of 
credit burned by Enron-like exposures have become cautious, lowering the 
percentage of any energy loan they will hold,” Oil and Gas Investor 
reported in November of 2002.863  
These larger banks sought safety and higher fees, thus chasing larger, 
publicly held oil and gas clients, leaving an opportunity for growth in local 
bank portfolios. Smaller independents that didn’t fit the surviving, national 
bank’s portfolio design had been encouraged to take their business to local 
or regional banks.  
Most of the capital formation in 2000-2001 was in the mezzanine and 
merchant-banking markets. Mezzanine markets doubled between 1999 and 
2001864 as many of the merchant banks that sprang up in the late 1990s, 
trying to copy Enron’s success, vied for market share in mezzanine and 
structured-financed transactions.  
Many of the utility and pipeline companies that followed Enron’s lead 
used producer financing to enhance earnings as well as complement their 
other business lines, including hedging and trading, commodity sales to 
power plants and through-put on their pipelines. “In the late 1990s through 
2001, the merchant players saturated the market with capital. All of them 
followed in Enron’s footsteps,” Kurt Talbot, a veteran mezzanine lender, 
observed in 2004. 
“The quest was for earnings, not necessarily cash returns. In the early to 
mid-1990’s, Enron turned the market on its head with its commodity-risk 
management and volumetric production payments. These were well 
                                                                                                                 
 863. Brian A. Toal, “Regional Bankers Court Borrowers,” Oil and Gas Investor, 
November 4, 2002. “‘During the past 18 months, many money-center banks have up-tiered 
their energy client focus, neglecting the small-cap independent,’ says Arthur R. (Buzz) 
Gralla Jr., senior vice president and director of all U.S. oil and gas banking for Guaranty 
Bank.” Toal, “Regional Bankers Court Borrowers.” 
 864. Tim Murray, Wells Fargo Energy Capital, “IPAA Oil and Gas Investment 
Symposium Private Capital Conference” (presented at 2005 OGIS Private Capital 
Conference), April 18, 2005. 
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structured, low risk and price-competitive. This was a model that was, and 
should have been, imitated. … Each of the merchant players was attempting 
to place $300[-] to $500 million of capital a year in the market.  
“There was no deal that could not get done. … What started as senior 
debt morphed into subordinated debt, project equity and even venture 
capital. Ultimately, that’s why many of these portfolios blew up.”865 
Spectacularly, Enron blew up. In December of 2001, it filed for 
bankruptcy, ending months of analysts’ queries about opaque financial 
statements, accounting disclosures and SEC investigations. The company 
began in 1985 with the merger of two staid pipeline utilities, following 
FERC’s deregulation of interstate pipelines. Houston Natural Gas Pipeline 
merged with Omaha-based InterNorth Pipeline. In time, Enron became the 
most innovative and aggressive trading house in the country.  
To survive in a deregulated world, Enron reinvented itself in the 1990s 
with the assistance of a young consultant from McKinsey & Co., Jeff 
Skilling. Enron began entering long-term, fixed-priced energy contracts and 
trading natural gas through the use of forward contracts and other 
instruments. Over time, Enron concentrated on financial instruments and 
trading markets, straying from its foundation that had been built on hard 
assets, particularly pipelines and natural resources. 
Between 1990 and 2001, Enron Energy Capital Resources Group had 
invested nearly $5 billion in E&P companies through project finance, 
equity, mezzanine debt, senior debt, convertible debt, volumetric 
production payments and other instruments.866 Its downfall was unrelated to 
its capital lending and investments in oil and gas assets. Meanwhile, the 
innovation it brought to financing U.S. independents is largely unknown by 
the general public or by new, capital-hungry producers that now access 
capital under debt structures invented and made commercial by Enron.  
In 2002, other major power companies and pipeline operators that were 
trading commodities in competition with Enron also saw these business 
units fail. Many of them had also launched energy-finance units, including 
Duke Energy’s Duke Capital Partners and Southern Co.’s Mirant Americas. 
Late-comers, their units were only dabbling in energy finance, relative to 
Enron’s portfolio; their parents, focusing on their own balance sheets, found 
                                                                                                                 
 865. Kurt Talbot, Goldman Sachs E&P Capital, quoted by Snow, “Minding the Gap.” 
 866. Nissa Darbonne, “A Major E&P Capital Provider, Enron is Busy With Its Own 
Finances,” Oil and Gas Investor, January 30, 2002. 
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better uses for their capital and decided to abandon this “non-core” 
business.867 In 2006, energy attorney James McKellar reported: 
Their lower debt and equity costs, without the regulatory 
constraints of banks, allowed them to create large profit margins 
on their producer financing and their hedging and trading 
businesses. Securitization of the producer finance portfolios 
allowed Enron and others [utilities and pipelines] to accelerate 
profits, which further increased the appetite and lowered the cost 
for producer loans. The model fell apart with the Enron failure. 
The rating agencies, who had failed to properly account for the 
risks that the trading, hedging and financing businesses put on 
balance sheets, moved quickly to downgrade the ratings of these 
companies. Production financing and hedging operations were 
sold, spun off or terminated as these companies went into 
bankruptcy or shed assets to improve capital, save credit ratings 
and avoid bankruptcy.868 
The mezzanine market had expanded from $200 million in 1991 to $1.3 
billion in 2001. During 2002 and 2003, it declined to between $300- and 
$500 million.869 The few still standing included three of the original shops: 
TCW, General Electric Energy Capital and Wells Fargo Energy Capital.  
The loss of sources of mezzanine capital meant less competition and 
higher pricing. Energy-capital broker Cameron Smith said in a 2002 article, 
“In the classic theory of supply and demand, yes. I’m more concerned, 
however, that for a while at least, mezzanine capital will simply be much 
more difficult to find.”870  
Predictions were that, with the loss of Enron, Shell and others, equity-
kickers in the form of overrides would cost more.871 Another energy 
financier, Scott Johnson, observed in 2002, “The core market of mezzanine 
investors has been decimated since the beginning of the year. Of five key 
mezzanine investors last year, only two are left. The mezzanine financing 
                                                                                                                 
 867. Producers, such as Royal Dutch Shell and Range Resources Corp., that had 
producer-finance units struggled with the capital-allocation decision as well and, ultimately, 
decided to exit the field. Murray, “The Ins and Outs of Mezzanine,” 31. 
 868. McKellar, “‘Oil and Gas Financing, ‘How It Works,’” III.B.1. 
 869. Wells Fargo Energy Capital Presentation on Mezzanine Debt Markets, IPAA 
Capital Markets Conference 2004. 
 870. Nissa Darbonne, “Where Art Thou Mezzanine Financier?,” Oil and Gas Investor, 
June 4, 2002. 
 871. Darbonne, “Where Art Thou Mezzanine Financier?” 
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business has certainly been hurt. The remaining investors will be much 
more selective than ever before, so companies will need to present strong 
projects and they will need to present them well.”872  
Smith wrote later in 2002, “With the implosion of Enron, Aquila and 
Mirant, and the withdrawal of Shell, a crucial question may yet be: what 
assets and team, well-suited to the private-capital psyche, are in, or are 
about to come into, the market, perhaps as distressed prices, perhaps with 
books of business yet available for instant gratification?”873 
The market response to the dire forecast of the dearth of mezzanine 
providers was quickly answered—perhaps sped on—by the increase in 
margins that the surviving mezzanine lenders experienced. Within fewer 
than 24 months, the void was filled by new players: Macquarie Energy 
Capital, led by former Cambrian Capital bankers; Royal Bank of Scotland, 
led by ex-Enron lenders; BlackRock Energy Capital, consisting of the 
producer-finance unit formerly within an E&P company and now known as 
BlueRock; Petrobridge Investments, led by ex-Mirant and -Shell Capital 
lenders; Goldman E&P Capital, led by additional ex-Enron lenders; and 
NGP Capital Resources, formed by private-equity provider Natural Gas 
Partners.874 
The Oil and Gas Price Rush of the 2000s 
9/11 not only gave rise to new banking regulations; crude oil prices slid 
on an already-weakened world economy and increases in OPEC production. 
WTI had exceeded $35 in November of 2000; a year later, it was less than 
$20 and wouldn’t find $35 again until 2003.  
Natural gas followed the opposite course, however. The Nymex price 
had spiked above $10 during in the winter of 2000-2001; after the attack, it 
fell below $2. But it quickly resumed its steady climb as the winter of 2001-
2002 drew down reserves. The price was more than $5 in January of 2003; 
beginning in December of 2003 and except for a few days, the prompt-
month contract did not trade below $5 again until 2009.875 
                                                                                                                 
 872. Darbonne, “Where Art Thou Mezzanine Financier?” 
 873. Cameron Smith, Cosco Capital Management, LLC, “Plenty of Private Capital 
Available- to the Right Type Companies,” Oil and Gas Investor, September 4, 2002. 
 874. Natural Gas Partners formed NGP Capital Resources in November, 2004, to 
capitalize on opportunities created by an estimated $2 billion of primarily mezzanine capital 
that had exited the energy space during the prior three years. Brian A. Toal “Focused On 
Yield,” Oil and Gas Investor, April 29, 2005; Amiel David, PeTech Enterprises, IAEE/IELE 
Conference, Houston Texas December 11, 2003. 
 875. U.S. EIA, Independent Statistics & Analysis. “Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price.” 
Accessed March 6, 2016. Eia.gov. 
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As for oil and also beginning in 2003, its price consistently grew as 
well—based in part on commentary that the world had found peak oil-
production capacity; thus, no future net supply growth was possible.876 The 
inability of the U.S. to replace its oil reserves, much less reduce its 
dependence on imports, was the topic du jour. Not since the Arab-embargo-
derived oil crisis of the 1970s had the theory of declining reserves espoused 
by King Hubbert in 1956 gained so much traction and general 
acceptance.877  
In 2005, energy analyst and investment banker Matt Simmons’ Twilight 
in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy was 
published, asserting that the limitless Saudi fields were, in fact, limited and 
that their ability to make up the rest of the world’s declining reserves would 
become a crisis sooner rather than later. Simmons’ analysis found support 
by historically low spare OPEC capacity during 2004-2005. 
Bill Weidner wrote in 2008, “The numbers are compelling. In 1986, 
when OPEC had approximately 17 million barrels of excess daily capacity, 
the world had consumed 566 billion barrels of crude oil since Colonel 
Drake drilled his first well in Pennsylvania in 1859. In the … years since 
1986, however, the world has consumed almost another 566 billion 
barrels—and OPEC’s excess productive capacity has dwindled to a number 
almost too small to measure.” 878  
The U.S.’ perceived dependence upon foreign oil was not just an 
economic issue; it was a national security issue. In January of 2007, at a 
hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, the director of geopolitics and energy at New America 
Foundation testified, “Simply put, there is no economically plausible 
scenario for a strategically meaningful reduction in the dependence of the 
                                                                                                                 
 876. The root of the advancement was in Hubbert’s Peak projection in the late 1960s. It 
was further propelled by the U.S. invasion of Iraq and post-9/11 economic rebound, rising 
Asian demand and Gulf of Mexico production disruptions that had been caused by 
hurricanes Ivan, Katrina and Rita. 
 877. King Hubbert predicted in 1956 that U.S. oil production was likely to hit its peak 
somewhere between 1965 and 1970, a theory, “Hubbert’s Peak,” that would forever be 
linked to his name. Yergin, The Quest, 237. 
 878. William Weidner, “Private Capital Flow,” Oil and Gas Investor, March 14, 2008, 
accessed March 1, 2016, Oilandgasinvestor.com. During much of 2004 and 2005, one 
analyst calculated OPEC’s spare capacity to produce oil was less than 1 million barrels per 
day. James L. Williams, WTRG Economics, “Oil Price History and Analysis,” Wtrg.com, 
accessed March 16, 2016. 
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United States and its allies on imported hydrocarbons during the next 
quarter century.”879  
American production was perceived as being on a terminal decline and 
dependence upon foreign oil would only increase. Accordingly, the price of 
oil, which had grown into the $50s and $60s by January of 2007, began to 
take off on a steep and continuous rise, finding $80 that September and 
topping out at nearly $150 in July of 2008.  
As prices continued their seemingly inexorable rise, oil and gas loans—
once perceived as a risky and even “alternative” investment by some 
bankers—were now highly valued as safe, quality loans. David Reid with 
Capital One Southcoast Inc. said in a May 2008 article, “The E&P sector 
has become one of the lowest-risks businesses for banks. For the past 
decade the loss to the banking industry on proven-reserve-based loans has 
been virtually zero.”880  
Natural gas was in the money too. Power-generation demand was 
growing in the 1990s and 2000s as a result of increased use of natural gas, 
rather than coal; a growing U.S. economy; and increased electricity use via 
the preponderance of digital services and devices. Hot summers and cold 
winters piled on, along with a drought in the U.S. Northwest that reduced 
hydro-generated power supply there.881  
Further jumps in price during the 2000s were caused by massive losses 
of production as a result of hurricanes Ivan in 2004 and Katrina and Rita, 
both in 2005. In December of 2005, the price of natural gas on Nymex 
exceeded $15 as a result of reduced supply and the fear of another 
exceptionally cold winter.882 
George Mitchell and the Shale Revolution 
In the midst of the run-up in natural-gas prices, the marketplace wasn’t 
giving much consideration to newly proven production that was possible 
from shale. The other Hubbert’s Peak—the one Hubbert forecasted in the 
                                                                                                                 
 879. Dr. Flynt Leverett, Director of Geopolitics and Energy at the New America 
Foundation, Testimony before United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, January 10, 2007. 
 880. Gary Clouser, “Regional Credit No Problem,” Here’s the Money: Capital 
Formation 2008, Special Supplement to Oil and Gas Investor, May 2008, 20. 
 881. Mary Ann Capehart, “Drought Diminishes Hydropower Capacity in Western U.S.,” 
Water Resources Research Center, accessed on February 15, 2016, Wrrc.arizona.edu. 
 882. Price figures from U.S. EIA, Independent Statistics & Analysis. “Henry Hub 
Natural Gas Spot Price.” Accessed March 6, 2016. Eia.gov. Storage figures from U.S. EIA, 
Independent Statistics & Analysis. “Lower 48 States Natural Gas Working Underground 
Storage.” Accessed March 6, 2016. Eia.gov. 
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1970s for natural gas—was a problem gas producers had persistently faced 
since the early 1980s. One producer in particular set out to coax gas out of a 
shale formation, the Barnett, in North Texas. 
George Mitchell, a self-made billionaire and social visionary, was born 
in Galveston, Texas, as the son of a Greek immigrant.883 After receiving his 
engineering degree with an emphasis in geology from Texas A&M 
University and serving in World War II, Mitchell went to work as a 
wildcatter based in Houston. The company, Christie, Mitchell and Mitchell, 
eventually became Mitchell Energy & Development Corp.  
In a 1998 biography of him and the company, Mitchell said of Harold J. 
Vance, his petroleum-engineering professor at A&M, “He had a real 
homespun philosophy. He said, ‘If you want to go to work for Exxon (or 
Humble at that time), fine, then you can drive around in a pretty good 
Chevrolet, but if you really want to drive around in a Cadillac you’d better 
go out on your own someday.’”884  
Vance was influential in the careers of many oilmen and oil bankers. As 
a professor, for example, he taught oil and gas property valuation to Tom 
Stevens, who in the 1970s became the head of First City’s energy group. 
Later in his career, Vance himself joined the ranks of energy bankers as the 
head of Bank of the Southwest’s oil and gas department. Full circle, Bank 
of the Southwest was one of the lenders Mitchell relied upon as he was 
building his company. Vance became a director of the bank.885  
Mitchell financed his early production from a core of investors who 
stayed with him for decades. Joseph Kutchin, the biographer, wrote, 
“Mitchell began his career partnering with his older brother Johnny and 
wildcatter, Merlyn Christie to form an independent oil company Christie, 
Mitchell and Mitchell, just like the generation of wildcatters before him. 
Without any production to speak of they were unable to get bank financing. 
Instead, he would work up a prospect from geological information and tips, 
                                                                                                                 
 883. Story told by Mitchell to Budd Clark. Mitchell’s father took on the name of his rail-
gang paymaster, Mike Mitchell, as he was told that “his name, Savvas Paraskevopoulos, was 
too damn hard to pronounce.” 
 884. Kutchin, How Mitchell Energy & Development Corp. Got its Start, 187. Ironically, 
while Mitchell owned a few Cadillacs in his day, he never put on airs or acted like his assets 
were worth hundreds of millions of dollars. For example, anyone could find him eating 
breakfast most Saturday mornings in his hometown of Galveston at his favorite breakfast 
spot with childhood friends and the rest of the local breakfast crowd. And, after pitching to 
the Galveston City Council a public effort he would underwrite to rebuild the city after 
Hurricane Ike, he and his team rode back in a cab; he jumped in the middle of the back seat.
 884. . 
 885. Tom Stephens, interview by the author, October 12, 2012. 
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acquire some leasehold on the cheap and try to sell portions of the prospect 
to local investors.” 
 Mitchell told Kutchin, “I would do the geology and engineering, get the 
deal together, and then we’d have some land man help us get the leases 
together and Johnny and Merlyn would go down to the Esperson Drugstore 
[in downtown Houston] and sell the deals. That’s how we started. They’d 
sell an eighth here and an eighth there, they’d sell over coffee, and the first 
thing you know, we had a deal that cost $30,000. We’d get maybe at first a 
32nd carried interest, and then a 16th carried interest.  
“Anyway, first thing you know, we started building, and then we got our 
quarter net profits, and soon we started taking more of the deals ourselves. 
So Johnny and I and Merlyn kept building the company gradually. If we’d 
drill a well, make a well, we’d run to the bank to get some money. If you 
drill a dry hole, you get nothing.”886 
An early success for the company was the development of Boonsville 
Field, a gas field north of Fort Worth. The field showed little promise to a 
number of major oil companies, which had drilled 11 dry holes into the 
formation and determined the rock too tight to produce; besides, they were 
looking for oil, not gas.  
Based on a tip from a Chicago bookie, Mitchell acquired acreage in the 
field and began drilling it in 1952. He looked at the geology and knew that 
a new technology was the answer that prior energy companies exploring in 
the area failed to employ. He told Kutchin, “Hydraulic fracturing had just 
come in about two or three years before. Without hydraulic fracturing you 
couldn’t make decent wells. So this is where we combined the engineering 
with the geology to make it feasible.”887 
After his initial well, Mitchell could see the formation was a large 
stratigraphic trap. Within 90 days, with help from his go-to investors, 
Mitchell leased 300,000 acres at $3 an acre.  
He needed more money. And just as H.L. Hunt’s original loan from First 
National was based on the bank’s president confidence in the East Texas 
Field, Mitchell found a receptive audience in Vance. B.F. “Budd” Clark had 
joined the company in 1956 as its chief financial officer and retired in 2002 
as its vice chairman. Kutchin quoted Clark, “Fortunately, there was an 
energy banker [Vance] at Bank of the Southwest who had been George’s 
professor at Texas A&M. He did something that was done very rarely, if at 
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all, in that he lent George money on the basis of the logs showing what 
reserves were behind each well, even though the well wasn’t producing. He 
saw the logs and the fact that the wells were good, so he had his department 
lend against them which was highly unusual.”888 
The story of how Clark was hired by Mitchell in 1956 is another 
testament to the close relationship of oil and gas men and their bankers. At 
the time, the company was still Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell. Christie 
wanted to hire a “Harvard man” to help with the company’s business 
affairs. Clark had received his MBA from Harvard Business School as a 
Baker Scholar after WWII on the G.I. Bill and had posted his resume with 
the Harvard Business School alumni group in Houston. Grover Ellis, an 
energy banker with First City in Houston, passed the resume on to 
Christie.889  
The Boonsville Field that Bank of the Southwest agreed to loan against 
became the foundation upon which Mitchell Energy was built. But, by 
1981, after more than 30 years of development and natural declines in the 
wells’ production, the company needed to find more supply to continue to 
fulfill a contract with Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America that dated 
back to 1953.  
It had been long-known that the source-rock for the gas Mitchell had 
been producing from the field was the Barnett shale, which had too low a 
permeability to economically tap with ordinary measures. Beginning with a 
well drilled in it in 1981, the company failed to produce economic Barnett 
wells until 1996, when it significantly altered its fracture-stimulation 
recipe.890  
As with many discoveries from Columbus on, there were both elements 
of stubborn perseverance and serendipity in Mitchell’s breakthrough. 
                                                                                                                 
 888. Kutchin, How Mitchell Energy & Development Corp. Got its Start, 66.  
 889. In the summer of 1956, the last person Clark met during a day of interviews with the 
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over the years. 
 890. Darbonne, The American Shales, 13. 
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Mitchell had spent millions of dollars and years drilling wells into the 
Barnett, experimenting with ways to produce the gas he knew was there. 
His engineers had been using a gel mixture to fracture the shale formation 
based on the commonly held theory that a water-based fluid would cause 
the clay in the shale to swell and seal the fractures that were created by the 
hydraulic pressure.  
To save on costs, Mitchell’s senior completion engineer, Nick 
Steinsberger, began experimenting with using a lower concentration of 
chemicals, but still keeping the fluid a gel that would carry the sand 
(proppant) mixture downhole to prop open the fractures caused by the 
pressurized solution. But as the engineers reduced the concentration of 
polymer chemicals, it became more difficult to maintain the gel consistency 
of the fluid.  
In the summer of 1996, on-site for a frac job, Steinsberger noticed that 
the gel frac mixed by BJ Services Inc.’s crew wasn’t cross-linking. “Instead 
of Jello, it looked more like a slickwater solution.”891  
Recognizing that the fluid wasn’t gelling properly, the crew went ahead 
with the completion anyway. Contrary to the conventional theory, the 
well’s results were surprisingly good in spite of the “faulty,” watery 
fracturing fluid.892 Steinsberger compared notes with other producers, 
including Union Pacific Resources Group Inc., which was experimenting 
with its fracs in tight rock in East Texas. 
On the S.H. Griffin No. 4 vertical well, Steinsberger and the group 
finally came up with a mixture of polymers, sand and water that proved a 
success.893 The initial rate of production was strong—1.5 million cubic feet 
a day—and, unlike prior fracs in the Barnett, stayed strong.894  
 As did Columbus, Mitchell had to go hat in hand to his lenders more 
than once to continue to fund his exploration. And, like Columbus, through 
determination, perseverance and stubborn luck, he and his engineers turned 
a mistake into a discovery that changed the world. Along with the Drake 
well, Spindletop, the Santa Rita No. 1 and the Daisy Bradford No. 3, the 
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S.H. Griffin No. 4 should be added to the pantheon of wells that changed 
history. 
As the breakthrough was under way, a lawsuit against Mitchell Energy 
and unrelated to the Barnett-shale project was filed in Wise County in the 
spring of 1996, claiming well-water contamination dating back to, at least, 
1978. Plaintiffs won a $200-million judgment and their neighbors filed suits 
as well.895  
Mitchell went to his bankers for a $250-million letter of credit to secure 
the company’s appeal bond. Manufacturers Hanover was administrative 
agent of the credit facility at the time and polled the syndicate for support of 
the special loan.896 It was more a “life line” than a line of credit; the 
company had to fight the court decision lest it and copy-cat suits destroyed 
the company.  
One syndicate member was Bank One. It had inherited the Mitchell 
account when it bought out Bank of the Southwest in 1990, where Vance 
had led the energy department. Long-time Bank of the Southwest loan 
officers Buzz Gralla and Dick Sylvan, working as Bank One officers, 
supported Mitchell’s request, but needed the approval of Bank One’s credit 
officer, “who was not an [oil and gas] guy and he didn’t want to do it,” 
Sylvan said in an interview in 2014. 
Gralla, Sylvan and bank president Charlie O’Connell favored the deal. 
As the discussion became heated, Sylvan told the credit officer, “Damn it! 
George is a director of the bank and he’s in trouble. The lawsuit is bullshit. 
It’s time to stick by our customer.”  
After the meeting, O’Connell admonished Sylvan for being “a little 
aggressive” with the senior credit officer, but, ultimately, the bank 
approved the loan.897 The letter-of-credit facility secured Mitchell Energy’s 
appeal bond and right to appeal the jury verdict. The appellate court 
overruled the trial court. A similar lawsuit was ruled in favor of Mitchell in 
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trial. The other lawsuits were dropped by attorneys who couldn’t see a 
means of getting paid by a victory.898 
Mitchell Energy “had been victorious, but at a high price,”899 Kutchin 
wrote. The stock had been under a dark cloud of litigation for more than a 
year and gas prices fell in mid-1998 to less than $2.900 Mitchell had 
exhausted the patience and credit of his lenders. In annual bank meetings 
during the early 1990s, he and his officers told the lenders of the Barnett’s 
gas potential, but the low production rates were barely breaking even.  
Sylvan said, “One year, at the Mitchell bank meeting, Homer Hershey, 
Mitchell’s vice president in charge of North Texas operations, told the 
bankers, ‘Next year, we’re going to be drilling a new formation. We have 
had mixed success so far; to date, returns are flat right now. But we see a lot 
of potential. The wells are expensive and all need to be frac’d because it is a 
tight formation.’”  
The following year, Hershey reported again. “Homer said, ‘We can 
report good news in the Barnett—our costs to frac are down by a half, plus 
we are getting two times the returns on production. We are getting a 4-to-1 
return. So we are going to drill a lot more wells.’ Only later we found out 
that the 4-to-1 returns were not the average, but the exception. There were 
more unsuccessful wells that didn’t yield 4-to-1 returns.”901 
Another of Mitchell’s lenders recalled, “He was just trading dollars, not 
really getting back any more from the wells than the cost he spent to drill. 
(By the end of the ’90s), the company had piled on so much debt to afford 
all its spending that lenders wouldn’t offer more.”902 
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Mitchell’s board concluded it was time to rein in spending, including the 
company’s efforts in the Barnett. By January 1999, Mitchell announced a 
20% reduction of its staff.903 That spring, however, the outlook began to 
improve with the changed-up recipe in how the Barnett wells were being 
fracture-stimulated.904 Upon continued success, Mitchell sold the company 
to Devon Energy Corp. in early 2002.905 
Devon took Mitchell’s technology and multiplied the results, using 
horizontal-well technology. “Mitchell’s application of water fracs in my 
opinion proved the Barnett was a viable play. Devon’s application of 
horizontals moved the play into a boom,” Dan Steward, a Mitchell 
geologist, reflected in a 2013 article.906  
As word leaked, other operators began experimenting with horizontal 
wells and Mitchell’s completion recipe.907 Producers and investors caught 
shale fever and began searching from basin to basin for the next bonanza—
very much like their brethren of a century earlier as wildcatters moved from 
boomtown to boomtown, buying up leases and chasing one gusher to the 
next.  
However, instead of seeking leases of a couple of acres—or even less, as 
in the East Texas Field—these new wildcatters were chasing whole basins, 
encompassing tens to hundreds of thousands of acres and resulting in 
thousands of wells. The effort required—and continues to require—massive 
capital. 
Signing bonuses for leases in the area of the Haynesville play, for 
example, had been going for between $200 and $400 an acre before the 
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play was discovered; this grew to nearly $30,000 an acre in the most 
competitive area.908 In the Eagle Ford, one South Texas rancher was handed 
a $1-billion check to drill his 106,000 acres.909  
To hold leased acreage, an explorer has to make a producing well prior 
to an agreed deadline or lose the lease. And these shale wells could cost 
more than $10 million each. Producers quickly stretched all existing capital 
sources and needed more.  
Banks and other sources responded aggressively to the improving 
commodity-price environment and demand for capital. In 2005, oil and gas 
loan volume increased 40% from the prior year; in 2006, it grew another 
36%. Loan volume in 2006 was $164 billion, compared with $67 billion in 
1997. As banks competed to lend more money to oil and gas producers, 
they reduced the cost to record lows, maturities were pushed out and 
covenants were made looser.910  
In addition, new mezzanine and private-equity providers were looking 
for ways to get a piece of the hot energy market. As a result, there was a 
much deeper and broader pool of capital available to small- and mid-cap 
E&P companies than historically had been the case. From commercial debt 
and public-market capital to private-equity funds, the array of capital 
choices and dollars grew to an all-time high heading into 2008. The number 
of mezzanine providers increased from a handful after the Enron meltdown 
in 2001 to some 20 by 2007.911 Around 2004, in addition to the traditional 
two-tiered senior-bank-debt/mezzanine-debt structures, traditional energy 
banks began to compete indirectly with mezzanine by offering a new 
structure between their conforming senior-lien loan (Tranche A) and the 
mezzanine (junior-lien) loan.  
                                                                                                                 
 908. Chris R. Gideon, CPL, interview by the author, March 17, 2016. 
 909. DrillingInfo reported that Shell Oil Co. leased Dan Harrison III’s 106,000-acre 
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 910. Brian A. Toal, “Rising Credit Tide,” Here’s the Money: Capital Formation 2007, 
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As commodity prices for oil and gas continued year-on-year increases 
above historical norms, banks were slow to keep pace in the increases to 
their price decks used to determine the conforming borrowing base.912 This 
meant a considerable gap between bank decks and the 12-month strip—
therefore, considerable value above what a borrower could expect from the 
senior lender’s conforming borrowing-base value of its oil and gas assets 
versus the amount its current cash flow could justify. Thus, an opportunity 
was created and the lending community responded to fill the void, 
providing more debt load for the producers to carry.  
The structures went by different names, including the “Term B” or 
“Tranche B” loan, the “Senior Stretch Tranche” and the “Senior Second 
Out.” But these, basically, priced in between senior debt and mezzanine 
debt—that is, between 100 and 300 basis points over the price of the senior 
bank debt that enjoyed lien and payment priority over mezzanine facilities. 
This intermediate capital was typically employed as a stretch piece to 
help companies in connection with an acquisition of producing and non-
producing properties. By making a stretch loan against the borrower’s 
“lesser collateral”—i.e., more heavily weighted to proved undeveloped 
(PUD) reserves—lenders were able to compete with the alternative, 
mezzanine sources. These “stretch” loans were usually intended to be short-
term debt with around a one-year maturity and with little to no prepayment 
penalties. But if rising oil and gas prices stopped propping up the 
producer’s loan, just like musical chairs, bankers and producers could find 
themselves without a seat when the music stopped. 
If made by the producer’s existing senior bank group, they could be 
documented under the same credit agreement and secured by the same 
collateral as the Tranche A “conforming” loan. These loans were an 
attractive alternative to a company that had a low-value conforming 
borrowing-base asset mix and didn’t want to incur the expense of 
negotiating a separate mezzanine facility or the cost of issuing public debt 
or diluting equity.  
The Tranche B was typically a term facility—i.e., non-revolver—fully 
funded at closing with a fixed amortization and maturity earlier than the 
Tranche A facility. The expectation was that the borrower would refinance 
the Term B loans within the stated maturity through an increase in the 
Tranche A borrowing base due to increased production as a result of 
drilling and development with the dollars provided under the Term B loan 
and/or through sales of non-core assets.  
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As the decade progressed, Term B loans were making a strong showing 
in a number of high-profile transactions from 2004 through 2007. Credit 
Suisse reported having made three such loans in 2004, five in 2005 and 14 
in 2006.913  
Because of the ever-increasing demand among shale pioneers for debt 
capital, the popularity of the Term B loans did not squeeze out the 
alternative lenders, who issued billions of dollars of second-lien loans to the 
industry. This was remarkable growth for a type of financing rarely 
employed prior to 2000.914  
But the success and high rate of repayment of second-lien paper 
encouraged further growth of mezzanine lending during the middle of the 
decade. These proliferated as institutional money was drawn to the private-
equity-type returns on capital that was secured with collateral and governed 
by debt covenants. As mezzanine loans to E&Ps grew to more than $100 
million per borrower, the ability of the alternative lenders to syndicate their 
second-lien facilities increased liquidity in this market, making it even more 
attractive to institutional investors.  
Syndicated second-lien term loans looked very much like the senior 
syndicated loan with administrative agents. In addition to a higher cost and 
looser financial covenants, which were usually limited to just an asset-
coverage test, another difference in the market was the composition of the 
syndicate members. Unlike the senior-loan market, the second-lien market’s 
participating lenders typically were not commercial banks but were 
insurance and private-funds investors. 
An example was the senior and second-lien loans to Ram Energy Inc. 
agented by Guggenheim Partners LLC, a private investor. To enter the 
energy-capital market in 2005, Guggenheim hired Tim Murray, who had 
been the head of Wells Fargo’s energy-lending group, to start its Houston 
office. In connection with Ram’s acquisition of Ascent Energy Inc. in 2007, 
Guggenheim arranged a $175-million senior secured revolving credit 
facility and added a $200-million senior secured Term B facility from a 
syndicate of lenders led by Guggenheim. The loan syndicate consisted of 
more than 15 institutions, including banks, insurance companies, 
institutional funds and private equity.915 
                                                                                                                 
 913. Ellen Chang, “Term B Loans,” Here’s the Money: Capital Formation 2007, Special 
Supplement to Oil and Gas Investor, May 2007, 42. Among the financings were ATP Oil & 
Gas Corp.’s offshore-drilling program and Venoco Inc.’s acquisition of TexCal Energy (LP) 
LLC. 
 914. Murray, “The Ins and Outs of Mezzanine,” 26. 
 915. Ellen Chang, “Mezzanine Capital,” Oil and Gas Investor, March 14, 2008. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
42 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 2 
  
 
As syndicated second-lien facilities became more liquid in the secondary 
markets, more capital became available to E&P companies. With the 
relaxation of Glass-Steagall regulations, the lines between investment banks 
and commercial banks blurred. Commercial bankers were becoming 
investment bankers and investment banks were arranging and syndicating 
senior and second-lien secured energy loans.  
Not all investment bankers shared commercial bankers’ business model 
of building lasting relationships, providing daily cash-management services 
and working through the ups and downs of commodity-price cycles that 
inevitably come with the oil patch. The investment banks generally did not 
have the ability to make revolving loans or process the borrower’s deposits 
and distribution checks, much less issue letters of credit needed by 
producers to support regulatory bonding requirements.  
Typically, the investment bank or private-equity shop held little of the 
actual commitments; instead, they syndicated the facility to a larger group 
that included not only commercial banks but other non-bank investors.916 
As the origination of loans and holding risks were separated, these facilities 
lightened up their covenants and closed the price gap between senior-lien 
and second-lien facilities.  
Bill Moyer, IPAA’s vice president of capital markets in 2007, said in an 
article, “The competition resulting from the abundance of capital sources 
led some providers to be more creative and aggressive – perhaps taking on 
more risks, sometimes, without the corresponding increase in the rate of 
return or addition of warrants and overrides.”917 
The harvest of the shale revolution was coming on strong, evidenced by 
the price-ratio divergence of gas to oil. During 2002 through 2006, the ratio 
was roughly the traditional 6:1—that is, six million Btu of natural gas are 
roughly equal to the value of one barrel of oil. In 2007, the 12-month strips 
were 10:1. In 2008, the ratio widened to 12:1 and, in 2009, would surpass 
30:1.918 
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The downside of the abundant availability of capital in the earlier part of 
the decade became evident when global credit markets and both oil and gas 
prices turned in mid-2008 and into 2009. The producers who needed to 
work through waivers or amendments found that their second-lien debt had 
become widely traded and ended up in the hands of opportunistic investors 
with whom they had no strong relationship, compounded by these 
investors’ minimal experience in E&P. Like public debt notes held by 
multiple investors, it became impossible to identify and negotiate with the 
debt-holders to amend the documents—even in the case of a healthy deal.  
Much to the dismay of a number of energy companies sitting on a great 
asset base while facing constrained cash flows to meet debt service during 
this credit crunch, conference calls to discuss covenant-waiver terms would 
end up with lenders positioning and arguing amongst themselves, while the 
borrower died on the vine.919 One facility, in particular, epitomized the 
dysfunction of these “loan to own” lender groups when the lead lender’s 
lawyer fired his private-equity-lender client to represent the balance of the 
lender group with the hope of salvaging a deal to restructure the debt.920  
Commodity prices kept rising through the first half of 2008 to heights 
that, to many, seemed unsustainable—and they were. By July, the impact of 
the global recession and the continued growth in natural-gas supply 
reversed the price trends for both oil and gas. For those that bet oil prices 
would fall sooner than they did, the crest came too late. SemGroup LP 
suffered a $2.4-billion loss on short positions. What had been brewing for 
months resulted in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in July.921 
Because SemGroup was a major purchaser of oil, the impact of its 
bankruptcy was felt by many producers in Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, New 
Mexico and elsewhere. Producers’ claims, filed in bankruptcy court in 
Delaware, highlighted the questionable efficacy of a law that had been on 
the books in Texas and a handful of other producing states since the 1980s 
regarding the priority and perfection of security interests in oil and gas 
production and related proceeds.  
Prior to the SemGroup bankruptcy, royalty owners, producers and their 
lenders in these states operated under the assumption that they had a self-
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perfected priority lien over the production purchaser’s creditors.922 The 
Delaware court, however, held that Texas’ non-standard provision for 
automatic perfection in favor of producers would be junior to purchase-
money security interests in SemGroup’s accounts receivable. Moreover, 
because SemGroup was a Delaware entity, the law of Delaware governed 
perfection of liens over the accounts.  
When oil prices collapsed in the 1980s, Delaware’s legislature did not 
see fit to follow other states in enacting self-perfecting lien protection for 
producers and royalty owners. Producers and mineral owners, if any in 
Delaware, did not comprise as significant a voting block as in Texas.  
The only way for them to have a secured lien on SemGroup’s estate 
would have been if they had complied with Delaware’s lien laws, which 
required filing a financing statement with the Delaware secretary of state’s 
office in compliance with Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code—
something few, if any, producers had done. Accordingly, many producers—
and their lenders—were left with unsecured claims and received 40 cents 
on the dollar.923 
As of today, it remains to be seen whether the SemGroup decision affects 
the credit underwriting and documentation of secured production loans to 
independent producers. The issue is of greater importance when considering 
where the producer’s assets are geographically concentrated and whether 
sales of production are to just one purchaser. Likely, given the severe 
downturn in prices beginning in the second half of 2014, there will be 
ample data points to see if producers and their lenders learned the lessons of 
the SemGroup decision. 
If a producer’s purchaser did become bankrupt, the producer and his 
creditor should be exposed, at most, for a month or two of production 
proceeds, if the producer is selling its production under month-to-month 
contracts. The producer should be able to quickly switch to a solvent 
purchaser. But even a couple months’ production can add up. For example, 
one producer, Enterra Energy Trust, had a $10-million claim, primarily 
consisting of sales to SemGroup during June and July of 2008.924  
Typically, as seen in more-comprehensive mezzanine facilities, there is a 
requirement that the lender has the right to approve who purchases the 
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borrower’s production. Accordingly, under such a covenant, an alert lender 
might be able to protect its collateral—and its borrower’s receivables—if it 
were aware of that one of the purchasers had less-than-stellar financial 
credentials. At this point, however, most mezzanine lenders fail to exercise 
such level of oversight; there is even less monitoring of to whom borrowers 
sell production under conforming reserve-based facilities. 
The collapse of the U.S. housing market in 2007 that marked the 
beginning of the recession only indirectly affected the energy industry.925 
Many of the companies affected by the credit crisis included some of the 
energy industry’s largest commercial-bank lenders which led to bank 
consolidation. The toxic nature of poorly underwritten home-mortgage 
loans infected the U.S. and international financial markets.926  
The effects were multiplied by the use of credit-default swaps and 
collateralized debt obligations held by hedge funds, money-market funds, 
investment banks and private-equity funds.927 Subsequent inquiries by 
governmental commissions seeking to identify the cause and propose future 
protections concluded the following in part: 
[T]he banking supervisors failed to adequately and proactively 
identify and police the weaknesses of the banks and thrifts or 
their poor corporate governance and risk management, often 
maintaining satisfactory ratings on institutions until just before 
their collapse. This failure was caused by many factors, 
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including beliefs that regulation was unduly burdensome, that 
financial institutions were capable of self-regulation, and that 
regulators should not interfere with activities reported as 
profitable.928 
It was a rebuke that bank regulators would take to heart with respect to 
oil and gas loans as commodity markets turned south again in late 2014. 
BNP Paribas was one of the first commercial-lending institutions to feel 
the effect of the meltdown; in August 2007, it blocked cash withdrawals 
from three hedge funds in its U.K. branch, citing “a complete evaporation 
of liquidity.”929 U.S. banks were estimated to have lost more than $1 trillion 
on toxic assets made up of collateralized subprime debt obligations and 
other debt derivatives from January 2007 through September 2009.930  
In 2009, 140 U.S. banks failed.931 The FDIC estimated that, by the end of 
the third quarter of 2009, there were 552 “problem institutions” at risk of 
failure. For seasoned bankers, this was all eerily reminiscent of the mid-
1980s, when more than 1,500 U.S. banks failed; this time, however, oil and 
gas and Texas real estate were not the culprits.  
The financial storm that had been brewing hit the financial markets the 
weekend of September 13, 2008, just as Hurricane Ike made landfall south 
of Houston. Ike left a trail of destruction over the resort island of Galveston, 
into Houston and The Woodlands, and north, heading to Dallas, essentially 
along the Interstate 45 corridor and the energy industry’s world capital. 
Power failures and streets blocked by downed lines and trees prevented 
many oil and gas executives and their bankers from getting to their offices. 
Often, Internet access was impossible as well.932  
As Texas residents were beginning to take stock of the hurricane’s 
destruction in the daylight hours of that Saturday morning, Federal Reserve 
and Treasury officials were in tense talks in New York with the chairmen of 
the worlds’ biggest investment banks. The goal was to secure a savior for 
Lehman Brothers, the U.S.’ fourth-largest investment bank.  
But, when Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson refused to sweeten a 
Barclays or Bank of America takeover of Lehman with public money, 
Lehman’s fate was sealed.933 It announced just after midnight the Monday 
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morning of September 15 that it had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. On the same day, Merrill Lynch, seeing Paulson’s writing on the 
wall, announced it would be acquired by Bank of America.  
The following day, the Federal Reserve organized an $85-billion bailout 
of AIG for an 80% equity stake that was extended further in October by $37 
billion and by another $40 billion in November. On Thursday, the Treasury 
Department issued a guarantee that $1 in a money-market fund was worth 
$1.934  
That same day, Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke met in the 
conference room of the House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, to propose a $700-
billion emergency fund, telling her and other leaders of Congress, “If we 
don’t do this, we may not have an economy on Monday.”935 The 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which authorized the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP), was signed into law on October 3, 2008.936  
Meanwhile, Houston’s energy executives and bankers and their 
employees were also keenly interested in when power would be restored to 
their homes and offices. It was restored up to weeks later in some of the 
city’s most heavily forested neighborhoods. However, recovery of the 
nation’s credit markets would require more time and much more capital 
before normalcy would return. The congressional commission studying the 
collapse reported in 2011, “Before it was over, taxpayers had committed 
trillions of dollars through more than two dozen extraordinary programs to 
stabilize the financial system and to prop up the nation’s largest financial 
institutions.”937 
Oil and gas borrowers looking for capital were affected along with every 
other business; the world’s capital markets essentially froze. Bernanke 
reported in 2011 to a congressional inquiry commission, “I honestly believe 
that September and October 2008 was the worst financial crisis in global 
history, including the Great Depression.”938  
Following a 10-day, $16.7-billion run on Washington Mutual Bank, 
which had an energy-lending group, the bank succumbed on September 25 
when the FDIC placed it into receivership. With more than $300 billion of 
assets, WaMu was the nation’s largest S&L and was roughly tied with 
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Continental Illinois, pre-failure, in terms of relative size to the financial 
system.939 It was immediately acquired by JPMorgan Chase.940  
The same day, Wachovia Bank lost $5 billion in deposits, immediately 
triggering the FDIC to look for a suitor for it. After a bidding war between 
Wells Fargo and Citigroup and with further regulatory intervention, Wells 
Fargo announced on October 3 that it would acquire Wachovia’s assets, 
including the bank’s energy-lending team, which was repurposed as an 
energy investment-banking team. The team, led by James Kipp, had been 
together since the downfall of First City in 1993.941 
Credit immediately became less fluid. Banks husbanded their reserves, 
while unsure of their own exposure to investments in collateralized-debt 
obligations and other asset-backed securities—and even less sure of fellow 
banks’ investments. Libor more than doubled from 3.11% to 6.44% the day 
after the Lehman failure. Banks were so wary of lending to each other that, 
at the end of September, they required an unprecedented premium of 400% 
above the Federal Reserve Bank’s target rate.942  
Faced with the resulting freeze in interbank lending, the U.S. Treasury 
was forced to announce on October 14 that, instead of buying distressed 
assets, it would recapitalize the U.S. banking system by purchasing up to 
$250 billion of senior preferred shares in nine large U.S. banks.943 Soon 
after this announcement, both the prime and Libor rates came down 
considerably.  
For many foreign banks—principally European banks participating in 
U.S. reserve-based loan facilities—their cost of funds stayed higher than 
that of U.S. borrowers, effectively putting them out of competition in 
energy lending—at least for a while. Even among U.S. banks, any borrower 
in 2009 that was looking to refinance or ask for any type of amendment to 
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its facility could expect an increase in the price. In many facilities, they also 
saw a floor on the Libor and prime rates.944  
Many borrowers were faced for the first time with the concept of 
“defaulting lenders.” Rodney Waller, senior vice president of Range 
Resources Corp., which had announced a year earlier its horizontal 
Marcellus-shale discovery well, said in a November 2008 article, “I am 
concerned that I might have a bank that is going to go away and can’t fund 
its commitment under these conditions from the crunch. JPMorgan, today, 
on our rollover revolver draws, will no longer give me funds from a bank 
unless that bank has actually sent that money to them.”945 
Bankers were experiencing this for the first time as well, questioning 
what right, if any, a participating syndicate lender could continue to enjoy 
under the loan documents if it was unable to fund its share of borrowing 
requests when requested. Lehman Brothers itself had only recently begun 
taking minor commitments in senior reserve-based loans.946 Administering 
revolving borrowing-base loans in which Lehman, through subsidiary 
Lehman Commercial Paper Inc., was a lender became very complicated 
when Lehman filed for bankruptcy. Senior-bank agents became more 
selective in whom they were willing to invite into a borrower’s syndicate.947 
Prior to Lehman, the language of the standard form of agented reserve-
based loan agreement did not contemplate that a lender would ever be in 
breach of its obligations. The credit agreements dealt only with 
contingencies for if the borrower became in default. In syndicated-loan 
agreements, certain decisions regarding the loan, such as whether to 
increase the borrowing base, require a unanimous vote of all “lenders.” 
Getting Lehman’s bankruptcy trustee or its counsel to focus on a request for 
a borrowing-base increase in any reserve-based oil and gas loan in which 
Lehman had less than a $10-million exposure was perceived as impossible 
in the midst of more than $1 trillion of claims against the estate.  
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The preferred action was to buy out Lehman’s position at par. But, where 
Lehman also had hedges with a borrower, the process required analysis, 
review and bankruptcy-court approval. It would take months for the court to 
permit action that would take Lehman out as a lender.  
Following issues with Lehman and questions as to other banks’ ability to 
fund their pro-rata share of borrowings, agent banks and their counsel 
began adding provisions or addressing “defaulting lenders” in the 
administration of reserve-based loans. Ultimately, in 2011, the Loan 
Syndications & Trading Association promulgated “standard language” 
addressing defaulting lenders that has become a part of the syndicated-loan 
documentation.948 
Falling Oil and Gas Prices: The 2008-2009 Edition 
Regional energy banks that were not hit as hard by the collapsed home-
mortgage market were able to increase their exposure to energy producers 
by purchasing, at a discount, secured syndicated energy loans from the 
money-center and foreign banks.949 These and other healthy banks were 
able to pick up the slack.  
The pullback had begun in August of 2007. Oil and Gas Investor 
reported in January of 2008, “A lot of those banks, [Mark Fuqua, head of 
Comerica Bank’s energy group,] says, recently had problems on some of 
their underwritings as the credit crunch advanced and the institutional 
hedge-fund, mutual-fund and insurance-company Term B loan market dried 
up. ‘So now these banks seem more willing to bring other banks like 
Comerica into deals to spread their underwriting risk.’”950  
In 2007, the structure and terms of first-lien debt to oil and gas producers 
were not affected by the liquidity problems suffered by some of the largest 
energy banks. However, by 2008, borrowers were seeing increases in 
pricing in response to the generally rising cost of long-term debt capital, 
especially in the second-lien market. Dorothy Marchand, another long-time 
energy banker, said in the article, “It appears that the trend we saw in early 
2007, in terms of lightening up on covenants, is moderating. Also, because 
many institutions have pulled back, we see pricing margins or spreads 
increasing.”951 
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Just months before Lehman’s failure, Mark Thompson, head of energy 
lending for U.S. Bank, was cited: 
“I would say that credit structures are getting stronger,” says 
Thompson. “Even stretch loans are becoming less aggressive and 
there is pressure in the credit markets to raise loan-pricing grids. 
Although the Federal Reserve has been lowering short-term 
rates, long-term rates really haven’t followed. So, the liquidity 
premium has been expanding and has been since June 2007. … 
Now, everyone’s cost of funds for long-term money has gone up, 
including banks’ costs of funds, and this will likely lead to an 
increase in loan pricing for producers.”952 
As oil fell from a July 3, 2008, peak of nearly $150 and gas from more 
than $13, price decks that had been slow to rise were now also slow to drop 
and the gap between the 12-month strip and the price deck that had 
provided a slice of the debt structure for “stretch” Tranche B loans 
evaporated. While the window for commercial banks to offer Term B loans 
was closing, non-traditional, mezzanine providers that still had dry powder 
to lend were happy to keep their windows open.  
But the subprime-mortgage crisis wasn’t limited to money-center banks; 
in fact, greater impact was felt by some of the private-equity investors and 
hedge funds. The institutional players that had begun to invest in the 
energy-capitalization business in the early 2000s in the midst of rising 
commodity prices began to drop out due to liquidity issues. Tim Murray 
said in a March 2008 article, “Debt pricing has increased and some 
institutional players have dropped out.  
“The institutional players I’m referring to are generally funds that have 
some liquidity issues due to the credit crisis, or have capital that is subject 
to mark-to-market (derivatives) influences. There are very few institutions 
pulling back from energy due to poor (energy) investments or lack of 
confidence in the industry.”953  
In general, mezzanine and other second-lien paper were harder to sell. 
Lenders had to raise pricing with rates increasing from between 3% and 4% 
in 2007 to between 6% and 8% in 2008.  
B.J. Brandenberger with Energy Spectrum Advisors Inc. wrote in March 
of 2009, “Anecdotal evidence suggests that each tranche of capital, 
including senior debt, mezzanine debt and equity, is beginning to require 
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returns comparable to their more risky junior counterparts, thus translating 
into a notable increase in today’s aggregate cost of capital for 
borrowers.”954 
Oil prices had begun falling after June of 2008, further constraining 
producers’ access to capital and willingness to hedge more future 
production. Just after the mid-September financial-market collapse, Greg 
Pipkin, a managing director at Lehman prior to its bankruptcy and who 
immediately moved his group to Barclays Capital, advised, “Start-ups 
should look for capital from people with whom they have a strong 
relationship. In a market like we are in today, capital is scarce. 
Relationships with strong institutions are needed to see an E&P through its 
business plan, whether three years or 10 years.”955 
With oil prices tanking and general public-equity-market investors’ fear 
of how much the stock market would eventually decline, accessing public 
markets for capital was too expensive for E&P companies. Capex budgets 
and acquisitions were cut back. The era of easy credit for the oil patch had 
ended just as it did for would-be home-buyers.  
Range Resources’ Waller said, “The E&P side of the energy business 
had been drilling in excess of cash flow for the last two and a half years. 
We are going to have to cut back. You can’t perpetuate this drilling activity 
with the credit markets and the fragility of the debt markets. Therefore, that 
‘wall of gas’ (from the shale plays) that everybody wants to talk about, 
can’t get here if nobody wants to drill.”956 
Some acquisitions were restructured and others were cancelled outright. 
Antero Resources Corp. had announced a $552-million acquisition of 
Marcellus acreage from Dominion Resources Inc., but had to scale it back 
due to its difficulty in obtaining follow-on financing “in the current market 
turmoil.”957  
At the end of September, Forest Oil Corp. completed an acquisition of 
acreage from Cordillera Energy Partners, but only after amending the deal 
to reduce the cash portion by $180 million and increasing the stock 
component of the purchase price. Forest had been trying to sell some 
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properties at the time. Its chief financial officer, David Keyte, said, “The 
disruption in the credit markets is adversely affecting the timing of our 
divestiture program as counterparties are challenged to receive adequate 
financing.”958  
Denbury Resources Inc. announced on October 8 that it would walk 
away from a $600-million acquisition of Wapiti Energy LLC’s Conroe 
Field, forfeiting a $30-million earnest-money deposit, citing a need to take 
“significant steps to preserve capital liquidity.” It reported: 
In light of the current state of U.S. capital markets, we have 
taken several measures to assure ourselves that our balance sheet 
will remain strong during these uncertain economic times. We 
believe that all of these steps are prudent in light of the current 
economic environment.959  
But the “wall of gas” coming online as a result of full-throttle Barnett 
and Fayetteville production—along with expectations from the recently 
announced Marcellus, Haynesville and Eagle Ford discoveries—was not to 
be stopped by anything as small as total global recession and a freezing of 
capital markets. Although the number of active rigs drilling for natural gas 
dropped in half from October 2008 to October 2009,960 the shale revolution 
kept producing results. Annual U.S. natural-gas production continued to 
grow and was still growing as of the end of 2015.961 
This was while prices tumbled from more than $10 in the summer of 
2008 to less than $2 in the spring of 2012. Wellhead gas prices remained 
low, but drilling continued as capital continued to flow to gas explorers and 
producers. Even in the low price environment, wells were being brought 
online at tremendously economic rates and demand for the gas was growing 
among power-generation operators and industrials.962 
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In late 2008, Tristone Capital Inc. reported on its survey of 
approximately 40 energy lenders. “Since starting the survey in second-
quarter 2005,” it wrote, “the participating banks’ oil and gas price decks 
have continually increased in the extended years from the previous-quarter 
results. With fourth-quarter 2008 being the first exception to this trend, 
first-quarter 2009 decks continue to decrease from the last quarter’s 
results.”963 Front-year bank pricing fell 34% for oil and 21% for gas. 
All the while, banks became more vigilant in assessing their producer 
borrowers’ ability to repay. Typically, banks set their price decks quarterly, 
but, as prices changed so precipitously, a number were looking at new 
decks on a monthly or more-frequent basis. Lenders and borrowers alike 
were dreading the Spring 2009 borrowing-base-redetermination season. 
In addition, the banks themselves had their hands full as borrowing-base 
season would be soon followed by the national-bank-examination season. 
Oil and Gas Investor reported in March of 2009, “The timing of low oil and 
gas prices, borrowing-base redeterminations, tight capital markets and the 
release of E&P audited financial results nearly coincides with an important 
time for commercial banks—their own national bank examination process 
… . This confluence of events is unfortunate for distressed companies.  
“A bank with E&P clients with borrowing-base deficiencies will soon 
see those loans downgraded to the high-risk category by examiners, says 
Tim Murray, Houston-based managing director of private energy capital 
provider Guggenheim Partners LLC … . The more high-risk loans a bank 
holds, the more capital it is required to reserve as bank examiners determine 
necessary capital ratios to protect depositors from bank failure. … If a bank 
can’t get additional capital, it has to sell assets, like loans, to shrink its 
balance sheet to meet mandated capital ratios.”964 
Expectations among both producers and lenders were that borrowing 
bases would be between 15% and 30% lower—across the board. A number 
of producers had already cut back on drilling. Thus, their reserve 
replacements were short of previous projections—another reason to dread 
the results of the banks’ evaluation. But as the results came in, relatively 
few were dealt a blow.  
“Many feared credit limits would be reset below a company’s current 
borrowings and with no cash to make up the difference,” Oil and Gas 
Investor reported in May. “The rolling event was supposed to throw a flurry 
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of assets into the marketplace. … The Redetermination Pandemic resulted 
in few fatalities in spite of the hysteria.  
“Why is this? The simple answer is that banks, also under assault in the 
current economic battle, have no place and no desire to warehouse all of 
those E&P assets. Like with the single-family housing foreclosure crisis, 
banks don’t want all these assets coming back on the books and tying up 
their lending ratios. Better to work it out with an otherwise healthy E&P 
currently making payments than to repo their assets.”965 
While bankers were wary of bringing more problems to their own credit 
ratings, 2009 was much different from prior commodity-price collapses. 
This time, many producers, at the direction of their lenders, had a majority 
of their production hedged out into 2010 or later and at pre-crisis oil and 
gas futures prices.966 Banks were able to factor into their redeterminations 
the producer’s hedged volumes, which were at prices above the banks’ 
lowered price decks. Hedges not only provided borrowing-base support; 
some producers were able to cash in some of their hedges to provide 
additional cash.967 
Although wholesale borrowing-base reductions did not occur, for 
producers whose borrowing bases were merely “reaffirmed”—that is, kept 
at the same level as in the fall of 2008—it was merely a stay of execution 
because, without access to additional capital, drilling would be curtailed. 
No new drilling meant undeveloped reserves would not be converted into 
production, thus further reducing the cash flow available for keeping up 
with interest payments.  
Bob Wagner, a former First City and Bankers Trust energy lender, co-
wrote in a May 2009 article, “Unfortunately, this is the beginning of a death 
spiral. With no capacity to develop additional cash flow by developing 
properties further, they will be like their 1990’s brethren, producing 
depleting assets just to pay interest.  
“Their assets will deplete but their debt will not, a problem that will only 
get worse. The business model they pursued, developing properties toward 
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an asset or company sale, is equally dead, with no buyers in sight at prices 
that will cover the debt.”968 
 Having survived the spring, attention turned to what the fall season 
might produce. In June, Jeff Forbis, a senior energy lender at Sterling Bank 
at the time, predicted, “If commodity prices remain at their current low 
levels, the autumn re-set season may be the most challenging. Lower capex 
budgets mean less drilling and reserve additions, and hedges will have 
rolled off - as such, borrowing bases may be even lower.”969 
More than 25 oil and gas producers had filed for protection under 
Chapter 11 by that time—more than twice that of the late 1990s.970 Tekoil 
& Gas Corp. filed in June 2008, when oil was in the $100s and before its 
Galveston Bay assets were hit by Hurricane Ike.971 Lothian Oil Inc., with 
West Texas assets, filed the following month.972  
Coalbed-methane producer CDX Gas LLC defaulted under its first-lien 
agreement agented by Bank of Montreal, accelerating its $105-million 
senior obligations on September 30, 2008, and triggering default under its 
$400-million second-lien term-loan agreement agented by Credit Suisse. It 
filed for bankruptcy on December 15, citing numerous challenges, 
including commodity prices, depressed credit markets and general 
economic turmoil.973 
Also in December, Ausam Energy Corp. and subsidiary Noram 
Resources Inc., whose assets were primarily on the Gulf Coast, filed for 
Chapter 11 protection.974 The Meridian Resource Corp. announced that 
month that it wasn’t in compliance with certain financial covenants and was 
in default. In April of 2009, its lenders, led by Fortis Capital, further 
reduced the borrowing base to $60 million. Its outstanding borrowing was 
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$95 million. Unable to cure the deficiency, it incurred an additional event of 
default under the facility.975 
During the year, Meridian entered into a series of agreements whereby 
the lenders agreed to forbear from exercising the remedies available to them 
under the loan documents as a result of the events of default. After an 
exhaustive marketing effort, Meridian was taken private in an acquisition 
by Alta Mesa Holdings LP.976 
Edge Petroleum Corp. and Chaparral Energy Inc. canceled their merger 
plan in December of 2008. In January of 2009, Edge was hit with a $114-
million borrowing-base deficit. It initially exercised its option to cure this in 
six monthly installments of $19 million each. But, without sufficient 
liquidity, it filed for Chapter 11 protection in October of 2009.977  
Saratoga Resources Inc., whose Texas Gulf Coast assets were struck by 
Ike and its Louisiana properties by Hurricane Gustav a couple of weeks 
earlier, filed on March 31, 2009.978 Hallwood Group Inc. had had a good 
run in the Barnett shale, selling its de-risked leasehold positions to 
Chesapeake Energy Corp. in 2004 and 2005.979 Its Hallwood Energy LP 
unit moved onto the Fayetteville play and to West Texas and filed for 
bankruptcy protection in March of 2009. It reported, “The U.S. and global 
capital markets are effectively frozen.”980 
Meanwhile, with a $5-million borrowing-base deficit, Crusader Energy 
Group Inc. also filed in March of 2009, just nine months after its IPO.981 
Another casualty of the Gulf Coast hurricane season, Energy Partners Ltd.’s 
borrowing base was reduced from $150 million to $45 million and $93 
million was drawn; it filed in May of 2009.982  
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By March of 2010, some 60 E&P companies had filed under Chapter 11 
or Chapter 7.983 Delta Petroleum Corp. had a $140-million deficit under its 
fully drawn, $295-million facility. It held on for a while, but filed by the 
end of 2011. 
In 2008, hedging was more widespread than during the downturn of the 
late 1990s.984 So why were there more bankruptcies than during the 
previous cycle? Most bankruptcies occur based on a confluence of events 
that are set in motion months and years before the filing. Other than a 
depressed commodity market, this cycle was affected by capital markets 
that were severely restricted and, for a couple of companies, weather-
related interruptions along the Gulf Coast.  
Delta, principally a gas producer in Colorado’s Piceance Basin, had 
quadrupled its acreage in 2008 and increased its proved reserves more than 
295%. In 2009, it drilled a string of 18 dry holes. Not replacing reserves—
combined with what it had that could not be deemed proved under newly 
lower gas prices—resulted in this collateral declining almost 90%.  
Delta’s borrowing base under a credit facility agented by JPMorgan 
Bank in November of 2008 was $590 million. Over time, it was reduced 
and Delta sold assets to shore up its balance sheet. Notwithstanding, it 
defaulted on covenants, triggering a workout as its original lenders became 
fatigued with the company.  
It was refinanced by Macquarie Bank Ltd. as an $18-million revolver 
and $15-million term loan at much higher interest rates. Unable to raise 
additional capital, find a joint-venture partner or a purchaser, it filed for 
bankruptcy in December of 2011.985  
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TXCO Resources Inc. was an example of a potential shale player that 
never got out of the gate in an example of “right place, wrong time.” The 
Eagle Ford play had been discovered in South Texas by Petrohawk Energy 
Corp. in the second half of 2008.986 But TXCO, which held acreage 
suddenly prospective for Eagle Ford pay as well, was already under water.  
During the second quarter of 2008, when oil was more than $100 and gas 
was more than $9, TXCO reported net income of $8.7 million, which was 
improved from a $1.3-million loss in the year-before quarter. Its operating 
income was $17.3 million.987 Meanwhile, a 2008-model Eagle Ford well 
cost more than $6 million—drilled and completed.988 
TXCO reported in May of 2009 that it was having “substantial 
difficulties in meeting short-term cash needs,” such as to pay vendors; 
meanwhile, energy prices and “a deteriorating global economy” were 
preventing it from accessing debt and equity markets.989  
James Sigmon, chairman and CEO, said in a news article a few days 
earlier, “There are companies that are ready to talk to us about buying 
portions of our acreage block or even the whole company. But that takes 
time, and in the meantime, our financial situation is deteriorating. We may 
not have enough time to stay outside of bankruptcy.”990 
The bankruptcy was a lesson for the senior secured lenders. Initial 
mortgages had been filed against the company’s early leasehold position 
when the loan was closed. Unfortunately, by the time the company filed 
bankruptcy, a significant number of its vendors were not yet paid. Under 
Texas law, these “mechanics and materialman” were entitled to liens 
against the wells they worked on or provided materials to.  
Typically, secured banks will be ahead of the “trade” lien-holders by 
filing their mortgage against the producer’s properties before any drilling 
begins, which is where TXCO’s lenders thought they were. As the 
bankruptcy claims and liens were analyzed, it became apparent that the 
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lenders’ mortgages did not keep up with the company’s property 
acquisitions.  
Lawyers representing the trade claimed that many of the company’s 
leases and valuable wells were not covered by the original mortgages and 
the bank group was “unsecured” on such collateral. The banks’ lawyers 
placed mistaken reliance on the mortgage’s typical “after acquired 
property” clause, assuming it would cover new leases after the original-
mortgage closing.  
After-acquired-property clauses are usually effective to create liens on 
additional interests acquired by the borrower in the same property already 
described and covered by the mortgage—for example, where a producer’s 
interest in a mortgaged well is increased after initial drilling and completion 
costs are recouped. But “after acquired property” granting language is only 
effective to put third parties on constructive notice to the extent the grant is 
in the chain of title of the property in question. It doesn’t cover unrelated 
leases acquired by the mortgagor after the original mortgage has been filed. 
The lenders learned this lesson without catastrophic cost, however—
because of the value of the acreage rather than of TXCO’s wells after 
Petrohawk Energy Corp. had made the Eagle Ford discovery well. In a case 
where the raw land repaid the loan, the underlying value of TXCO’s 
undeveloped leasehold exceeded the amount of its secured debt and 
creditors were all paid off 100 cents on the dollar.991  
The lenders, agented by Union Bank, in the Cornerstone E&P Co. LP 
bankruptcy were not as lucky.992 In Cornerstone, the court held that liens 
filed by third parties on properties acquired by the debtor subsequent to the 
original mortgage were subject to the bank’s lien only to the extent that the 
mortgage was in the chain of title prior to the filing of the third party’s 
lien.993 
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Kicking the Barrel Down the Road 
By September of 2009, oil had improved to $70, which was roughly the 
price two years earlier and highly economic for most producers. Gas prices, 
however, did not improve until after third-quarter 2009; price decks had 
already been reset by lenders. From its quarterly survey, Tristone Capital 
reported a first increase in bank pricing for crude oil in September, but gas 
lost another 7%, providing no help for gas-weighted borrowers.994  
However, most banks accommodated their borrowers that had good 
fundamentals and just needed more time to get past the fall in prices via an 
amendment, waiver or extension of maturity. It presented the opportunity 
for bankers and bank counsel to temporarily loosen covenants—without 
increasing commitments—in exchange for an increase in pricing, including 
floors on minimum interest rates.  
Meanwhile, with commodity prices at or near the banks’ price decks, 
new hedges could not provide any boost to the borrowing base—as 
producers who were unhedged were unwilling to do so at sub-$50 oil the 
previous spring or at sub-$5 gas that spring and into the fall. 
For gas-heavy companies, if lower prices held, the future was not going 
to be pretty. Rolling out the maturity was a way to kick the barrel—or, in 
this case, the Mcf—down the road in hopes of a price rebound and for the 
bank to avoid locking in a loss. Meanwhile, oil continued to recover, 
turning doubtful loans into performers. Under the rubric that “a rolling loan 
gathers no loss,” these amendments were affectionately known by the 
banking community as “extend and pretend.” 
Global Recession and the Shale Plays 
For many independents, such as TXCO, that were looking to hop onto 
the unconventional-resource-play train, the market collapse happened at the 
worst of times. Because producible shale resources can underlie entire 
counties rather than a few acres and because they are most economical 
when tapped with horizontal wellbores a mile or more in length, much more 
acreage is desired and needed. Meanwhile, the cost of drilling and 
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completing a well can be more than $10 million.995 The most aggressive 
independents in the shales were carrying massive debt loads in 2008.996  
A competition between Petrohawk and Chesapeake in leasing the 
Haynesville shale in the first half of 2008 led to lease-bonus prices of more 
than $25,000 an acre. Steve Herod, who headed business development for 
Petrohawk, said in The American Shales, that Petrohawk, alone, paid $2 
billion for acreage. “Several billion dollars of lease-bonus money went into 
North Louisiana in five months. … It was pretty amazing.”997  
Dick Stoneburner, Petrohawk’s chief operating officer at the time, said, 
“We went toe to toe with Chesapeake from March to August, just a six-
month period. But it was an incredible period to be involved in a play like 
that with Floyd [Wilson, Petrohawk CEO] and Aubrey [McClendon, 
Chesapeake CEO] going mano y mano to see who could end up with the 
best position. …  
“It was crazy but it worked. I mean, it worked for us. I think it worked 
for them. It’s hard to say. In the long run, it will.”998 
Chesapeake’s strategy was copied and envied. To finance its leasing and 
its drilling to hold the acreage by production before expiration deadlines, it 
outspent cash flow in all but three out of 34 quarters between 2004 and 
year-end 2012.999 During this eight-year period, its spending in excess of 
cash flow totaled more than $30 billion.1000 
Meanwhile, the “wall of gas” that was expected to come online as a 
result of full-throttle shale production was eventually factored into gas 
futures. Oil futures had rebounded by the end of 2009 to $80.1001 Gas, 
however, fell into the $3s by the spring of 2009 and, except for some 
winter-demand spikes, rarely had a glimpse of more than $5 thereafter. 
But most of the shale-gas discoverers and producers knew going in that 
they would have to drive down their costs via efficiencies of scale in such 
massive plays. Southwestern Energy Co. amassed 455,000 net acres in 
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Arkansas for an average of about $40 an acre before announcing the 
Fayetteville play.1002  
Richard Lane, a Southwestern executive during the discovery, said in 
The American Shales, “Think about doing anything 10,000 times. If you 
save a buck here and a buck there 10,000 times, it adds up quickly. That’s 
where the ‘manufacturing’ think comes in. You control your destiny by 
driving down cost.”1003 
With banks and oil and gas producers feeling optimistic, the dark days of 
2008-2009 were soon forgotten. Oil and Gas Investor reported in 2010, 
“Throughout 2009, banks instituted interest-rate floors; shortened 
maturities; and tightened financial covenants. The major change for 2010 
seems to be some leniency on debt maturities, i.e., four years as opposed to 
2009’s standard three year maturity.”1004 
Having felt the sting of borrowing-base reductions, producers that had 
the ability to access public debt and equity markets, when these reopened in 
2009, raised money and paid down their bank debt. Between the base-
redetermination seasons of the spring of 2009 and the spring of 2010, what 
was drawn under the senior revolvers had fallen from 64% to 44%. As 
borrowing decreased, bankers competed harder for new customers; loan 
syndications were oversubscribed, even for drilling deals. Bank pricing 
remained relatively firm. 
Wells Fargo’s Marc Cuenod observed, “Now the market’s hunger for 
new loans has resulted in oversubscriptions on many [syndicated] deals. 
Deal pricing has remained relatively firm and we’re seeing good 
opportunities for drilling deals, especially in the shales.”1005 
The U.S. was becoming more than satiated with new shale-gas supply. 
However, there was ample room in the market for new U.S. oil supply. 
New completion techniques in the Bakken tight-oil play in North Dakota 
and development of other tight oil after 2008 began contributing significant 
additional volumes of U.S. oil. Lenders were eager to finance shale-oil 
development. Oil and Gas Investor reported in February of 2013: 
 “The advent of the shale plays has been kind of a game-
changer for the mezzanine business,” says Mark Green, 
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president of Wells Fargo Energy Capital, in Houston. “… The 
shales have made mezzanine even more attractive because they 
have significantly reduced the reservoir risk, and it’s become 
more an issue of execution risk,” Green says.  
 “We’ve seen hardly any dry holes in the mature plays such as 
the Barnett and the Bakken. However, it takes a lot more dollars 
than it used to because of the high well and facilities costs, and 
our challenge is making sure that the drilling is economic in the 
current price environment.”1006 
Dodd-Frank and Banking Regulations 
In response to the 2008 credit-market crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in July of 2010. As 
bank failures had been big; the law is similarly big. The Economist wrote, 
“The law that set up America's banking system in 1864 ran to 29 pages; the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 went to 32 pages; the Banking Act that 
transformed American finance after the Wall Street Crash, commonly 
known as the Glass-Steagall act, spread out to 37 pages. Dodd-Frank is 848 
pages long.”1007 
The act was more like a set of guidelines than a law1008 and the task of 
implementing the law was left to federal regulatory agencies with a one-
year deadline. This was delayed and delayed. In 2013, according to one law 
firm’s estimate, 13,789 pages of rules containing 15 million words had 
completed only 39% of the process.1009 At year-end 2015, only 68% of the 
total rule-making requirements had been finalized,1010 the firm reported in 
an update. Energy banks responded to the prospective regulation—and 
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repeated investigations and fines by regulators—by getting out of the 
physical commodities markets.1011 
The act also prohibited national banks from owning or investing in 
private-equity funds.1012 In connection with the relaxation of the Glass-
Steagall restrictions on investment banking, beginning in the 1990s, a 
number of commercial energy banks invested in energy private-equity 
funds, such as EnCap and Natural Gas Partners, as a means of establishing 
relationships with these private bankers and, more importantly, with their 
portfolio companies.  
Private-equity sponsors would give their portfolio-management teams 
the equity capital to make an acquisition or acquire prospective acreage 
with the intention of quickly turning the investment into proven, producing 
reserves and a “commercially bankable” company. By investing in equity 
funds that sponsored start-up E&Ps vetted and underwritten by these 
experienced investors, the commercial bankers were the first in line when 
the portfolio companies had sufficient collateral to merit a secured credit 
facility.  
The symbiotic relationship was seen by the commercial bankers as an 
“energy-loan incubator.” For example, Amegy Bank was actively investing 
in 14 private-equity funds in 2008. Steve Kennedy, senior vice president, 
said in an article at the time, “This has proven to be a very good place to 
become involved early on with the new, developing companies.  
“And, because of our familiarity with these private equity groups, we 
have been in a position to help several companies find a good equity 
sponsor. We have made excellent rates of return on these energy private-
equity funds to date, so we anticipate continuing this activity for the 
foreseeable future.”1013 
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While commercial banks have ceased making further investments in 
private-equity funds as a result of Dodd-Frank, the funds and their portfolio 
clients have not suffered for lack of other investor appetite, filling the void. 
During each year following 2009, they committed record amounts of capital 
to invest in the upstream and midstream energy markets. 
The banks complied with the restriction on future investments in the 
funds, but some banks with unregulated subsidiaries have turned to making 
investments alongside the private-equity sponsors directly in the new 
companies. At least when banks invested in private energy funds, it was 
into a diversified portfolio of holdings, thereby spreading risk, much like a 
private individual lacking the resources to check out every public company 
will spread risk by investing in a mutual fund. With the prohibitions under 
Dodd-Frank, which intended to reduce risk to a bank’s capital by 
prohibiting investing in private-equity funds, it can be argued that the level 
of risk has been increased. 
Following on the theme of unintended federal regulatory consequences, 
banks have also complied with the letter of law under the federal flood-
insurance act.1014 The act requires that any real estate with buildings taken 
as collateral for a loan must obtain either a certificate that the collateral is 
not located within a flood zone or obtain flood insurance. The law was 
intended to fund the federal pool for insuring homes in flood-prone areas.  
Enforcement of the law took on a sense of urgency after New Orleans 
and other areas along the Gulf Coast were flooded by Hurricane Katrina. 
Regulators—hence, banks—became insistent upon literal compliance with 
the regulation—no matter the kind of real estate involved and even if the 
real estate consisted of hundreds of oil and gas leases where the value lay 
thousands of feet underground. Some energy lenders refused to advance 
funds at closing without the necessary flood survey or flood insurance.1015  
A work-around for reserve-based loans avoided the act altogether by not 
taking liens on “buildings” on the collateral. Rather than inspect each oil 
and gas lease to make sure there were no buildings, the banks modified 
their lien documents to expressly exclude from the mortgaged properties 
“all buildings as defined under the Flood Act.”  
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While this has satisfied compliance with federal regulations, it has meant 
that banks are foregoing liens on any buildings associated with the oil and 
gas properties. The question that has yet to be addressed is how the 
collateral’s value is affected if buildings on the property are critical to 
continued operations of the oil and gas production. Have banks solved for 
the immediate documentary headache only to find that—down the road, 
following a foreclosure or bankruptcy fight—there is a hole in their 
collateral? 
2013: Buyer’s Market at the Capital Bazaar 
2013 saw continued competitive pressure on a growing pool of energy-
capital providers in search of bankable projects. Public-debt markets 
chasing yield were open. Even sub-investment-grade E&Ps with B- or CCC 
ratings were able to access the high-yield bond markets at attractive rates. 
Accessibility of public debt, combined with a decrease in M&A activity, 
resulted in lower demand for borrowings from commercial banks.  
Nevertheless, capital options for the larger independents were as 
accessible and varied as goods at a Turkish bazaar. Producers were ready to 
deal as capital providers hawked their products with everyone using $100 
barrel oil as the common currency. No one gave much thought to how 
difficult it would be to untangle the producers’ complicated capital 
structures if oil prices were to fall before all the debt was repaid.  
M&A transactions in 2013 were off two-thirds from the prior year: $123 
billion in 2012 versus $38 billion in 2013. Not surprisingly, to keep dry 
powder and moderate floating-interest-rate exposure under credit facilities 
with fixed-interest-rate bond debt, many borrowers who could do so 
accessed the public-debt market to pay down their bank revolvers. 
Commercial energy lenders saw their borrowers’ average loan utilization—
the ratio of borrowed funds to the availability under the borrowing base—
falling as the year progressed. Commercial banks—especially regional and 
smaller banks lacking capital-markets capabilities to earn fees on the bond 
issuances—felt the pinch.  
Because of the continuing slow recovery in the general U.S. economy 
and the relative attractiveness of investments in the energy-loan market, a 
number of new banks entered the reserve-base-lending space, adding 
further price pressure on loan terms—much to the benefit of producer 
borrowers. Entrants in 2013 included Pittsburgh-based PNC Bank, which 
had a long history of lending to the coal industry and, with recent exposure 
to the local Marcellus-shale play, beefed up its oil and gas lending in 
Pennsylvania and opened a beachhead in Houston.  
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Fifth Third Bank out of Ohio, seeing the growth of the Utica-shale play 
in its backyard, picked up Royal Bank of Scotland’s entire Houston team 
and opened shop in the city. Amegy’s Kennedy said in an August 2013 
article, “As the capital costs of having an effective presence in a 
shale/resource play increase, we are seeing more companies narrow their 
focus into one or two main geologic areas. We are also seeing an increase 
in private equity investments, as E&P companies realize that the large 
equity commitments that such firms offer provide a strategic advantage in 
the new capital intense, acreage intense, shale resource plays.  
“For years, companies had to chase conventional reservoir traps, which 
varied in size, but tended to cover hundreds of acres. Since shale covers 
thousands, tens or hundreds of thousands of acres, the potentially 
productive areas are much larger than in the past. Now, one could literally 
spend a career developing and operating in one continuous geologic play, 
which was fairly rare in the past.”1016 
BB&T, a large North Carolina bank, was another newcomer to the 
reserve-based-lending market. Sterling Bank’s energy group, led by Jeff 
Forbis, opened a Houston office for it in 2011. 
The structure for reserve-based loans, however, had not changed much 
during the preceding 40 years—just the pricing and tenor. Forbis said in 
same the article, “The standard borrowing base revolving credit remains the 
cornerstone of the energy banking industry. For the most part, new deals are 
secure, have a five-year term semi-annual borrowing base redeterminations 
and are priced in the range of LIBOR plus 200 to 275. Covenants are 
generally: debt/EBITDA -4X, Interest coverage- 2.5X and Current ratio – 
1X.”1017  
Another phenomenon affecting not just bank pricing and overall 
competition for business was the aggressive demands of the larger private-
equity funds sponsoring E&P management teams—with some teams having 
few or no proved reserves. Without the PE muscle behind them, each team 
would not have commanded much attention of established energy lenders—
especially the bulge-bracket banks, such as JPMorgan, Citibank, Bank of 
America and Wells Fargo.  
But, when the profitability of the portfolio company’s new loan 
application was tied to the coattails of a private-equity sponsor’s overall 
commercial- and investment-banking business with these large institutions, 
                                                                                                                 
 1016. Gary Clouser, “Bankers’ Buzz - Plenty of bank capital available for growth-hungry 
E&Ps,” Oil and Gas Investor, August 2013. 
 1017. Clouser, “Bankers’ Buzz.” 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss2/2
2016]        Excerpt from Bernard F. Clark Jr.’s “Oil Capital” 69 
  
 
equity firms were able to exact pricing and covenant concessions for their 
portfolio constituents that, a few years prior, would have been extended 
only to the largest independents, such as Devon and Anadarko Petroleum 
Corp. 
Some banks were even willing to document “zero dollar borrowing base” 
loans. In this, no money would be funded upfront; the expectation was that, 
once the private-equity-backed borrower found an attractive acquisition, the 
loan documentation would already be in place, providing ready capital on 
short notice.  
Steve Trauber, head of Citigroup’s global energy investment banking, 
observed in an early 2014 Oil and Gas Investor article, “The reality is that, 
because of the amount of capital out there, the bank market is fairly 
aggressive. They’re giving loans and credit facilities out to companies at 
rates that don’t earn an adequate rate of return on a standalone basis. 
Instead, they rely upon the other businesses in order to get the rates of 
return they need on their capital.”1018 
Among smaller banks, their return on committed capital was not 
augmented by the ability to offer other capital products—lacking 
investment-banking or hedging capability and having a business model of 
participating in large facilities agented by the bulge-bracket lenders. 
Regional and local banks complained of losing clients to more aggressive 
lenders.  
Loans became very cheap for producers, according to David Zalman, 
chairman of Houston-based Prosperity Bankshares. He told FuelFix.com at 
the time, “Some banks are offering 10-year payout terms for loans that 
would normally get five-year terms stretching pricing and payout periods, 
and we’ve lost business because of it. What we have seen is some of the 
banks are even lending money on nonproducing property. That’s where it’s 
becoming a bigger issue.”1019 
Phil Ballard, one of Trauber’s fellow Citi bankers, said in the Oil and 
Gas Investor article, “It’s a very competitive market. Some recent deals 
have probably been a little more aggressive than they historically have been 
in terms of covenants and borrowing-base amounts. And because there are 
so many new banks coming in, if someone doesn’t like it, someone else will 
step right in to take its place.”1020  
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Not only were banks increasing the percentage of borrowing-base value 
derived from proved undeveloped (PUD) reserves—akin to the raw-land 
deals banked by the S&Ls in the go-go days of the 1980s—they were also 
including value to “probable” and “possible” reserves in acreage in the 
fairways of the more prolific shale plays, such as the Eagle Ford and 
Marcellus.1021 Although attributing collateral value to non-proven acreage 
was similar to the “lease line of credit” from earlier days, proved reserves 
still made up the bulk of the collateral in these producer loans.  
Additionally provisions were added in some facilities to allow the 
borrower’s private-equity sponsors the ability to prop up the client’s 
financial underperformance with equity infusions and thereby cure, albeit 
temporarily, financial-covenant defaults. These were the very same 
covenants that were built into credit agreements after the bust of the 1980s 
to alert bankers to the borrower’s ability to remain cash-flow positive, thus 
able to meet debt service on a current basis.  
Serving as advance-warning signals, these periodic financial tests 
provide banks with the ability to take action early in a deteriorating market 
to address problems before the collateral dissipates to less than what is 
needed for repayment. With “equity cure rights” these signals can be 
overridden and delay the lender’s ability to take action. 
Seasoned bankers, nevertheless, were not ready to pull back on the 
throttle. Perhaps this time it really would be different. Just like every other 
time it was going to be different?  
Mark Fuqua at Comerica Bank told Oil and Gas Investor, “We have this 
incredible confluence of tremendous resource base in the U.S. – where we 
are arguably the largest oil and gas producer in the world and still growing 
– coupled with this abundance of cheap capital. I’ve been through a lot of 
booms and busts, and I don’t know exactly where this one is going, but the 
fundamentals of it still feel pretty good to me right now.”1022 
Some experienced bankers by the beginning of 2014, were sounding 
words of caution, reporting that the commercial-banking sector was moving 
into a period of “unparalleled excess liquidity,” along with a lack of 
demand for their capital. Scotiabank managing director Mark Ammerman 
said, “It sounds funny to say, but you really don’t make much money 
lending money any more, certainly not in as challenging a market as we 
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have with today’s liquidity and increasing regulatory capital. You really 
make your money selling other products and services.”1023  
Regulators began to take notice of the loosening lending standards. In 
April of 2014, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency dusted off its 
25-year-old loan-examiner’s manual, rewriting its handbook on oil and gas 
production loans and describing supervisory expectations for prudent 
policies and procedures for lending to the E&P industry.1024 
More conservative bankers and regulators, however, were out of sync 
with borrowers’ expectations. Producers’ management teams began 2014 
with much optimism. A February 2014 survey by Forbes and CIT of 141 
senior U.S.-based energy executives found their short- and long-term 
outlooks for both oil and gas pricing and profitability to be unabashedly 
upbeat. More than 80% of the participants described 2013 as profitable and 
they were predicting an equally profitable 2014. In addition, 91% 
anticipated they would be profitable during the next three to five years, 
66% expected oil prices to rise and 68% expected natural-gas prices to 
rise.1025  
Based on ongoing, rosy forecasts and high capital needs, many small and 
mid-size producers accessed junk-bond markets when they could to finance 
drilling. These offerings in the energy space reached $210 billion—roughly 
16% of the junk-bond market—a dramatic rise from just 4% of the market 
10 years earlier.  
The low-interest-rate environment since the financial crash of 2008 and 
the Fed’s $3.5 trillion1026 of bond purchases, beginning in 2009 and into 
October of 2014 via its “quantitative easing” program, flooded the markets 
with debt capital. But unlike equity, debt has to be paid back. And with the 
availability of different and diverse capital sources, producers ended up 
with capital structures as complex to navigate as the labyrinth of Istanbul’s 
Grand Bazaar: senior secured first liens under revolver-based credit 
facilities, second-lien loans from mezzanine providers and various tranches 
of publicly issued notes held by institutional investors.  
The phenomenon that spawned the renaissance of the U.S.’ independent 
producers—the unconventional-resource plays made viable by horizontal, 
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fracture-stimulated wells—continued to feed small and mid-size producers’ 
demand for “easy money.” As is the nature of the junk-bond market, lots of 
money flowed to less-capitalized companies with much-riskier drilling 
prospects than the larger independents, such as EOG Resources Inc., 
Pioneer Natural Resources Co., Anadarko, Devon and Apache Corp.  
Some of the small to mid-size independents were venturing into untested 
formations and the marginal edges of unconventional plays, while not 
having a lot of cash on hand—the same reason they couldn't offer 
investment-grade bonds. The junk market was over-heated even before the 
price of oil began to decline after June of 2014. Forbes estimated that $500 
billion in debt had been advanced to producers, consisting of $300 billion in 
leveraged loans and $200 billion in high-yield public notes. By 2014, 
energy claimed 16% of the high-yield market, a fourfold increase from the 
prior decade.1027  
A New York-based money manager said in a December 2014 Bloomberg 
article, “There was too much money going into this space that would have 
resulted in problems long-term – now that timeline has been 
accelerated.”1028 
 
CHAPTER 9: OPEC DELIVERS A THANKSGIVING TURKEY 
“‘This time it’s different.’ The four most expensive words in 
English.” 
—John Templeton  
 
As the oil and gas industry proved a century earlier, nothing breeds 
failure like success. The flush production brought about by each new field 
discovery since Spindletop has caused local—and sometimes national—
prices to collapse. 
The current generation of producers and bankers had grown up in an 
environment where American oil production had been in decline since the 
mid-1980s. By 2008, production had fallen 40% from a May 1985 high of 
9.1 million barrels a day to 5.4 million.1029  
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The force of the shale revolution during the aughts turned the tide in the 
2010s. By April of 2015, as the Bakken play expanded and the Eagle Ford, 
Niobrara, Oklahoma Woodford and Permian Basin unconventional-
resource plays developed, U.S. production had reached 9.7 million barrels a 
day—catching up to a peak not seen since April of 1971, 44 years 
earlier.1030  
This growth in U.S. unconventional oil production was unchecked by 
any state regulatory controls, just like the days before successful proration 
laws kept excess production in line with market demand. Reminiscent of 
the boom following the East Texas Field discovery, crude-oil storage rose 
to levels that had not been seen since the early 1930s.1031 
Such a prodigious increase in production did not escape the attention of 
Saudi Arabia and its fellow OPEC members. The U.S. was turning oil 
tankers away.1032 Saudi Arabia’s sales to the U.S. had been reduced to, 
roughly, the equivalent of as much oil as its own, co-owned refinery on the 
Texas coast processed daily.1033  
As a result of the shale revolution, it was not only OPEC losing U.S. oil-
market share to American independents. Growing U.S. natural-gas 
production from shale plays had pushed LNG tankers and Canadian supply 
away as well. Compared with 44 years earlier, domestic gas production was 
substantially higher by 2015.1034 
The Saudis had been hinting during the fall of 2014 that they were no 
longer going to be the swing producer that balanced world oil supply with 
demand, propped up prices and indirectly subsidized Iran, Russia and 
others. The Saudis had played this trump card in 1985 when it increased its 
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exports from 2 million barrels a day to its full quota of 4 million. The result 
of the Saudis’ actions depressed oil prices well into the 1990s.  
While American producers sat down for Thanksgiving dinner in 
November of 2014, OPEC members announced that they would not 
decrease their output that would have stemmed declining world oil 
prices.1035 Sometime between the stuffed turkey and the pumpkin pie, the 
price of oil dropped more than 10%.1036 And, as world markets digested the 
news, WTI fell from more than $73 per barrel prior to Thanksgiving to $53 
as the New Year began.1037 
December is normally quiet in the energy-lending business, but, in 2014, 
bankers’ and producers’ holiday plans were interrupted by OPEC’s 
declaration and the market’s response. Bankers spent the following weeks 
re-setting price decks and stress-testing their borrowers’ loans against the 
new value of oil reserves by which their loans were secured. Borrowers in 
turn were busy revising their forecasted 2015 development-capital spending 
plans and reviewing their long-term drilling contracts. 
Responding to lower prices, producers started the year by slashing their 
capital-investment budgets. Before the New Year, public companies 
announced, on average, that they were reducing their capex by a third.1038 
The U.S. rig count that had been averaging close to 2,000 dropped steeply. 
By March, the number of rigs at work had been cut nearly in half.1039  
Yet, even with deep cuts in drilling budgets, producers continued to 
outspend cash flow in the first quarter of the year. If not for the value from 
above-market oil hedges, producers would have had to cut capital 
expenditures 70% to balance their books.1040 Capital investments in the 
field can take between three and 12 months to turn into production. Thus, it 
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was no surprise that U.S. production remained resilient during the first part 
of the year—and even continued to grow.1041  
Part of the reduction in capital costs came at the expense of the rig 
contractors, who saw long-term rig leases cancelled or the price 
renegotiated. Additional pain was spread to every additional member of the 
oilfield-service industry to bring down producers’ operating costs.1042 Even 
a Houston law firm that specialized in lease acquisitions and title opinions 
and had caught a 10-year ride on the shale wave shuttered its doors by the 
end of 2015 as leasing activity came to a halt.1043 More than 40 oilfield-
service companies went out of business or filed bankruptcy during the 
year.1044  
Producers who could reduced staff and focused on preserving cash 
flow—i.e., doing more with less. Productivity gains were made through 
greater efficiency with multiple well-pad drilling and completions, faster 
drilling times and higher production rates through better completions and 
longer horizontals. Some of the gains were made possible, ironically, by 
newly lower oilfield-service costs and that, as rig and completion crews 
were being laid off, service providers retained their best employees to work 
on what remained. 
Importantly, producers in all basins high-graded their drilling inventory, 
putting aside testing outside of the core of their plays and cherry-picking 
only the best locations to better insure a return on investors’ dollars, profit 
to pay interest on outstanding debt and proved reserves to support their 
bank loans.1045 In early 2015, following their December top-down loan-
portfolio review, bankers by and large were still positive that their 
borrowers could survive oil in the $50s—if it didn’t last too long.1046  
While there was limited concern within the banks, energy-loan-weighted, 
regional lenders watched as their stock prices lost 20% since oil had peaked 
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at $108 in June of 2014.1047 Notwithstanding the market sentiment, banks 
did not take precipitous action to declare “wild card” borrowing-base 
redeterminations. In general, the consensus was that OPEC would relent 
and the markets would quickly rebound.1048 
In fact, even by the scheduled Spring 2015 borrowing base season, the 
predictions of substantial borrowing base reductions failed to materialize. A 
survey of producers and energy lenders early in the year predicted 
borrowing-base reductions would average 25%.1049 The borrowers’ angst 
was unmerited: Reductions averaged between 10% and 15%, helped in 
great part by oil hedges that had many borrowers’ production still getting 
more than $90 barrel.  
Banks did drop their price decks as the spring-season redetermination 
approached, but not as aggressively as spot prices would suggest. Typically, 
banks set their price decks for determining the borrowing base at a discount 
of around 80% of the current front-year WTI Nymex price and up to 90% 
of the five-year forward curve, but, because of the precipitous drop in 
prices, the quarterly price decks set by the banks were above the front-year 
and five-year curves.1050  
“Industry executives have let out a palpable exhale as we exit the spring 
borrowing base redetermination season,” Oil & Gas Financial Journal 
reported in June of 2015. “ … Ultimately banks settled on modest to no 
reductions in borrowing bases, [which were accompanied with] numerous 
amendments that included covenant holidays around [audit opinion] going 
concerns [exceptions], leverage tests, and asset coverage tests.”1051 
Banks’ price decks reflected market sentiment early in the year, which 
was that prices, while low, would recover. The question being asked on the 
streets of downtown Houston during the first quarter of 2015 was how 
quickly prices would recover. Would the recovery be “V” shaped or “U” 
shaped? 
                                                                                                                 
 1047. Steinberg, “Falling Oil Prices Worry Regional-Bank Investors.” For 13 banks with 
energy loans that comprise more than 5% of their portfolios, shares were down more than 
20% on average since June 20, 2014.  
 1048. Nicole Freidman, “What Went Wrong in Oil-Price Forecasts?” The Wall Street 
Journal, December 10, 2015.  
 1049. “Haynes and Boone, Borrowing Base Redeterminations,” Haynes and Boone, LLP, 
September 18, 2015, Haynesboone.com. 
 1050. Macquarie Tristone’s Quarterly Energy Lender Price Survey, “Energy Lender Price 
Survey Q1 2015,” Static.macquarie.com.  
 1051. Josh Sherman and Sean Clements, Opportune LLP, “Capital Availability for E&Ps,” 
Oil & Gas Financial Journal, June 9, 2015. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss2/2
2016]        Excerpt from Bernard F. Clark Jr.’s “Oil Capital” 77 
  
 
A bump from $43 in March to $60 by May gave markets and producers a 
false sense that OPEC’s turkey didn’t have legs. To generate cash on their 
books, producers with the strongest assets and management went to the 
public market, selling equity and/or public debt securities. The biggest 
wave was during the first week of March with 55 energy offerings that 
raised $50 billion. In all, by the middle of July, 179 equity and debt 
offerings had raised more than $127 billion for Texas and Oklahoma 
businesses of which 90% were energy companies.  
But as quickly as the opportunity appeared, it was gone. Nymex traders 
went on Fourth of July holiday with the prompt-month contract for WTI 
trading at about $57. When they returned to their desks at 5 p.m. Central 
time Sunday, WTI declined 8%.1052  
And the price kept declining. “It was like someone turned all the spigots 
off,” William Snyder, head of Deloitte’s Texas restructuring practice told 
The Dallas Morning News. “The money just dried up.”1053  
Investors found out the March bump was more of a dead-turkey bounce 
than a true bottom. In fact, oil prices dipped even lower—into the $30s. 
Seeking reassurances that the price drop was not permanent, discussions in 
boardrooms and bank lobbies began to lean toward whether recovery would 
be “W” shaped rather than the “V” shape of 2009-10. As prices continued 
to languish, the feared “U” shape was becoming plausible; the shibboleth 
“lower for longer” began to creep into discussions.  
Producers adjusted again, further cancelling drilling and postponing 
completion of wells that had been drilled. OPEC’s Thanksgiving turkey had 
created a new specie of oil well—the “DUC” or “drilled but 
uncompleted.”1054 Because of the relatively higher cost of completing a well 
with hydraulic fracture-stimulation than drilling it, producers elected to drill 
but not complete wells until a rebound in prices justified the costs.1055 
Several began to refer to their DUCs as “oil in the bank.” When prices 
improved, they would complete them, bringing on the production when the 
market price was economic. 
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Notwithstanding their efforts at cost cutting, many producers’ spend 
continued to exceed cash flow. Facing potential reductions during the fall 
borrowing-base-redetermination season, many looked to sell non-core 
assets and to access more expensive capital. Most asset-owners were not 
willing to accept offers based on the current, depressed market price, so the 
delta between buyer and seller on the bid and ask meant few sales were 
consummated.1056 In some cases, a price was agreed upon, but the buyer 
walked away after the Fourth of July, even while having to forfeit the 
earnest-money deposit. 
In addition to asset sales, producers looked to capital markets for a 
lifeline to tide them over until prices rebounded. Public equity and debt 
markets had closed by July, but, albeit at a higher cost, private equity and 
debt were still options that some producers were able to secure.  
“[D]ebt investors are thinking about the best ways to play the next 
energy-industry distress cycle—but they are doing so with the utmost care,” 
The Deal reported. “Why the caution? Mostly because the secondary bond 
market opportunities aren’t what they used to be, so investors are betting on 
new secured debt, bankrupt companies’ bonds, and upside/downside 
strategies that hold promise in either a best- or worst-case scenario. Other 
financing structures, such as product[ion] payments, may require further 
clarity, and opportunities to replace bank lenders haven’t started 
materializing yet.”1057  
Given the precarious leverage of some of the more aggressive shale 
players, capital providers looked for assurances that their investments 
would be protected in the event the producer went bankrupt. Off-balance-
sheet transactions popular in the late ’90s were dusted off. Non-banks 
purchased volumetric production payments or made loans with equity 
kickers in the form of convertible overriding royalty payments that, upon 
repayment of the principal, would automatically convert to net profit 
interests in the financed properties. 
A new twist on the type of drilling dollars majors had contributed to 
independents back in the 1930s to prove up acreage was the financial-
partner “DrillCo” agreement, primarily beginning in mid-2015. Instead of 
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dollars from major oil companies, private-capital providers joined 
producers in drilling wells in this joint-venture structure in which the 
producer contributes raw acreage and the financial partner contributes 
drilling dollars in exchange for a working interest in the wells.  
In July, GSO Capital Partners LP closed one of the first such 
arrangements with Linn Energy LLC in which GSO agreed to finance 
100% of the wells, receiving 85% of the net proceeds until achieving a 15% 
internal rate of return on the wells. After reaching the hurdle, Linn would 
own 95% working interest and GSO’s interest would be reduced to 5%.1058 
Other shale players followed suit.1059 The DrillCo structure was favored by 
investors as a “bankruptcy remote” entity that would be separate from the 
producer’s assets in the event of bankruptcy. 
The different layers of debt that producers had been able to access in the 
heady days of $100 oil added complexity as well as cost to the borrower-
producer’s capital structure. Energy XXI, a Gulf of Mexico producer, 
already had a fairly complicated balance sheet. At the top of the market, it 
acquired EPL Oil & Gas Inc. by merger in June of 2014 with an acquisition 
price of $2.3 billion just before the price of oil began to fall. At the time, 
Energy XXI already had six tranches of debt, including its bank revolver 
and various unsecured public notes issued since 2010 totaling $3.4 billion.  
In connection with the merger with EPL, Energy XXI issued another 
half-billion in public debt. It issued another $1.5 billion of second-lien debt 
in March of 2015, sandwiched between the senior bank revolver and its 
public notes.1060 The March issuance was prompted by an anticipated major 
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cut to its borrowing base and gave these second-lien note purchasers a jump 
ahead of the existing unsecured debt-holders.1061  
These financings gave some producers a lifeline, while waiting for the 
hoped-for rise in commodity prices. For those already smothering under the 
weight of too much debt, the new money was more of a continuation of life 
support. For those unable to attract more capital, the only answer was to 
seek the protection of bankruptcy courts in the hope of restructuring their 
balance sheets. By May of 2015, 10 producers had filed for protection; this 
would triple by August and the year ended with 48 North American 
producers filing bankruptcy with combined aggregate debt in excess of $17 
billion.1062 By April 14, 2016, Energy XXI, with almost $3 billion in 
secured and unsecured debt, would become the 63rd North American 
producer to file for bankruptcy.1063 
Equity stakeholders and creditors owning first-lien, mezzanine and 
public bonds issued by these producers were confronted with a rude 
awakening. Producers had built extraordinarily complex capital structures 
since 2009 on the back of their properties’ worth at $100 oil and now were 
trying to pay it back with $30 oil. This made the orderly resolution of 
claims much more complicated by the time their collateral had lost up to 
two thirds in value. 
In the downturn during the ’80s, oil and gas bankruptcies were resolved 
between a small, manageable group of stakeholders: the producer, his 
banker and his trade creditors. In 2015, like a dysfunctional extended 
family gathering at Thanksgiving dinner, the party had grown larger and 
more complex, rife with competing agendas between and among the 
stakeholders picking over the same carcass. Now, stakeholders at the table 
had grown to also include any one or all of these: junior secured creditors, 
including mezzanine lenders and private equity note-holders; holders of 
secured preferred shares; holders of unsecured preferred shares; and holders 
of convertible bonds. Especially at the bondholder level, latecomers to the 
party included distressed-debt buyers that had purchased the notes in the 
secondary market at a discount with no prior relationship with the borrower.  
Further complicating restructuring a producer’s debt was the 
phenomenon where some creditors held more than one class of debt. For 
example, when an involuntary bankruptcy was filed against Energy & 
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Exploration Partners LLC, it had more than $27 million in trade debt, $375 
million in unsecured convertible notes and $765 million of first-lien 
reserve-based debt. By the time ENXP converted its case to a Chapter 11, a 
group of the unsecured note-holders had bought into the senior secured 
debt. As is typical, the senior secured lenders proposed terms under which 
they would agree to extend credit to ENXP during the pendency of its 
bankruptcy.  
Holding both secured debt and bonds, the “cross-over” creditors had a 
much different view of the best way to restructure the company than that 
held by the senior banks, which still held original first-lien debt. Upsetting 
standard protocol, the “cross-over” creditors proffered their own terms for a 
competing debtor-in-possession loan that were more beneficial to their 
unsecured debt-holdings.1064 Given the precipitous drop in collateral value, 
the only hope for the out-of-the-money creditors was that the borrower 
could convert its debt into equity in the restructured company as it exited 
bankruptcy. 
In many bankruptcies, bondholders were wiped out. Junior lenders were 
unsure of recovery. And even senior lenders were looking at possible 
impairment of their claims. 
New Gulf Resources LLC is an example of a private-equity-sponsored 
independent that leveraged borrowed capital to jump into the business just 
before oil prices crested. In May of 2014, it raised more than $500 million 
to acquire a large position in East Texas. The capitalization consisted of a 
first-lien RBL from MidFirst Bank with a borrowing base of $50 million, 
$365 million in 11.75% second-lien notes due in May of 2019 and $135 
million in 10%/12% senior subordinated PIK toggle notes due in November 
of 2019.  
Prior to filing bankruptcy, New Gulf explored exchanging the junior debt 
under the second-lien notes and subordinated PIK notes for notes with 
higher-ranking seniority in the capital structure (an “up-tier” transaction) in 
exchange for a reduction in the face value of the junior debt. The company 
reported, “The debt exchange pricing and the ratios of participating 
noteholders necessary to provide an adequate recapitalization were not 
economically viable given the then-current price of oil and gas.”1065  
By the spring of 2016, a few producers had already exited bankruptcy—
reorganized, shorn of most debt and with new owners hoping for brighter 
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horizons. Whether reduction of its debt burden would be enough to permit 
it to survive to the other side of the lower-for-longer environment remains 
to be seen.  
Producers that were dragged down by more complicated debt structures 
will be unable to reach escape velocity and will remain in a terminal orbit 
of intercreditor bankruptcy disputes until their assets are liquidated. No 
doubt, there were many more companies with billions of dollars of debt yet 
to file for the protection of the bankruptcy courts before the updraft of the 
next recovery cycle begins.  
Bank Examiners 
Since 2014, bank regulators had been more closely scrutinizing 
underwriting practices for oil- and gas-leveraged loans, publishing a new 
handbook on this for examiners for the first time in 25 years. The last time 
guidelines for evaluating oil and gas loans were revised was following the 
mid-’80s oil-price downturn and subsequent bank failures. 
Since the housing-market fiasco and imposition of Dodd-Frank banking 
regulations, the last thing regulators wanted was to be called before 
Congress to explain how they missed the next crisis in banking. Given the 
increasing complexity of independents’ capital structures and cognizant of 
the issues that arose from the shadow banking industry due to collateralized 
debt obligations carved out of home-mortgage loans that precipitated the 
2008 financial crisis, bank regulators focused in on the rising debt 
obligations of oil and gas producers created by both the banks they 
regulated and the unregulated private- and public-debt markets. 
The Federal Reserve reported in November of 2015, “Aggressive 
acquisition and exploration strategies from 2010 through 2014 led to 
increases in leverage, making many borrowers more susceptible to a 
protracted decline in commodity prices. … Classified commitments—a 
credit rated as substandard, doubtful, or loss—among oil and gas borrowers 
totaled $34.2 billion, or 15 percent, of total classified commitments, 
compared with $6.9 billion, or 3.6 percent, in 2014.”  
The Fed further warned, “Because of the growing volume of special 
mention and classified commitments, as well as the significant growth in 
the leveraged lending portfolio, the agencies will continue to monitor, in 
particular, the associated underwriting and risk-management processes in 
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the leveraged lending and oil and gas sectors.”1066 In particular, federal 
bank examiners began to focus on the total debt of the borrower and not just 
on the senior banks’ ability to protect its depositors’ money by recovering 
its first-lien loan. They criticized energy banks on a number of producer 
loans. Commercial banks appealed some of the criticized loans, but to no 
avail for the most part.  
There was a disconnect between the new regulatory approach and the 
historical view taken by energy lenders. In addition to looking at a 
borrower’s total debt—both secured and unsecured—regulators were 
insisting on tighter financial covenants to monitor a borrower’s ability to 
repay. In particular, in discussions between the banks and regulators, 
including an in-person meeting at Wells Fargo’s offices in Houston in 
September of 2105, regulators insisted that borrowers with a ratio of total 
debt to Ebitda in excess of 3.5:1 would not be given a passing rating, thus 
requiring greater bank reserves to be set aside.1067  
Subsequent to this meeting, bankers and regulators continued to discuss 
the proper metrics for evaluating energy loans. In preparation for the annual 
examination in early 2016, energy banks assessed their borrowers’ loans 
using a “total funded debt repayment test.” Loans to some of the borrowers 
with significant unsecured public debt were downgraded accordingly.  
However, following these loan downgrades, bank regulators came out 
with another set of revised guidelines for examination of oil and gas loans. 
In this, it appeared that the regulators stepped back from the “total funded 
debt repayment test.” Instead the guidelines indicated that examiners and 
the regulated banks should evaluate a producer-borrower’s ability to repay 
its total secured debt—not its total secured and unsecured debt.  
Bankers were pleased the guidelines for repayment focused on only 
producer’s secured debt, but questions remained. In addition to a 
“repayment test,” the guidelines set out certain financial-ratio tests in 
evaluating oil and gas loans. Financial-ratio tests measured against the 
borrower’s total debt and not just its secured debt. Whether this was 
intended to take back with the left hand what the regulators had given 
bankers with the right hand was not immediately clear.  
What is clear is that, as a result of the 2016 guidelines, it will be more 
difficult for oil and gas producers to obtain bank financing. The impact is 
already being felt by producers this spring as banks apply the new 
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guidelines in their loan policies and procedures during their spring-season 
borrowing-base redeterminations.  
The guidelines were issued at a time when producers were in the greatest 
need of flexibility from their lenders on their debt obligations and in need 
of new bank capital due to the lower commodity-price environment. For 
some producers on the margins, it may mean the difference between 
survival and bankruptcy. Although the intent of the regulations is to protect 
against imprudent lending standards, the end result of the new guidelines 
for banks may be to cause recognition of greater production-based loan 
losses than has historically been the case.  
 High recovery rates in prior downturns were due in large part to the 
cyclicality of commodity prices. Loans that default at the bottom of the 
cycle have had a high recovery rate for first-lien lenders that exercise 
patience and wait for the cycle to recover rather than aggressively 
exercising remedies when prices are at their lowest. A bank’s ability to be 
patient depends, in part, on what it costs it to hold onto the loan. The worse 
a loan is classified, the more reserves the bank must hold and, therefore, 
patience comes at a higher cost.  
 If bank regulators’ new guidelines make it harder for producers to get 
new financing from commercial banks, this could hinder healthy producers 
in financing property acquisitions. Without able buyers, distressed-property 
sales could cause market prices for oil and gas properties to fall lower, 
resulting in lower loan-recovery rates for distressed producers and their 
lenders.  
Texas endured a very slow economic recovery after the oil-price collapse 
of the mid-1980s. The S&L-triggered real estate bust put billions of dollars 
of improved and unimproved commercial properties on the market at a time 
when financial institutions were least able to help finance a recovery.  
A longer-term effect of the guidelines may alter the relationship that has 
existed between independents and bankers. The new guidelines place banks 
at a disadvantage when competing against providers of unregulated debt. 
The ultimate impact is hard to predict. One possible outcome is that banks 
may choose to no longer compete to be first-lien lenders to producers who 
also owe—or plan to issue—second-lien and unsecured notes.  
Certainly, producers with higher debt leverage will find it harder to get 
financing from regulated commercial bankers. This does not necessarily 
mean that oil and gas companies will be without access to borrowed capital. 
Restrictions imposed by the guidelines on commercial banks will create 
opportunities for alternative capital sources, including mezzanine lenders 
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and private-equity sources. As a result, producers can expect to pay more 
for leverage going forward. 
 
CHAPTER 10: IN CONCLUSION 




Sheikh Yamani, Saudi Arabia’s oil minister from 1962 to 1986 during 
the formation and rise of OPEC, predicted the end of the oil age in an 
interview with The Telegraph in 2000. “Thirty years from now there will be 
a huge amount of oil - and no buyers. Oil will be left in the ground. The 
Stone Age came to an end, not because we had a lack of stones, and the oil 
age will come to an end not because we have a lack of oil.”1068  
The same observation can be made that the U.S. didn’t stop using the 
horse and buggy because it ran out of horses. It was gasoline and the 
internal-combustion engine that drove demand for oil, prompting 
wildcatters to search for the modern El Dorado across the U.S. and the 
world. 
There will come a time when a new disruptive technology will overtake 
oil as the primary transportation fuel, altering the Hydrocarbon Age 
paradigm. It is human nature, after all, to innovate, driving perpetuation of 
our specie. Just as in the early 2000s, as the theory of “Peak Oil” was 
gaining acceptance within the industry and among policymakers, U.S. 
producers invented the “Shale Gale,” bringing a renaissance to 
independents and American energy independence.  
In contrast, economist Joseph Schumpeter identified another “gale” in 
the 1940s. The “perennial gale of creative destruction” is the basic 
architecture of capitalism, he wrote. It “incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating the new one. This process of Creative Destruction is 
the essential fact about capitalism.”1069 
Schumpeter predicted that the same processes that enabled capitalism to 
succeed the pre-capitalistic framework would also eventually bring its 
downfall. Innovators would not only push aside “institutional deadwood,” 
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but, in the end, destroy the partners and structures upon which the 
foundations of capitalism were built.1070  
The many cycles of boom and bust within the oil and gas industry 
seemingly validate the predicate of Schumpeter’s theory. With every new 
discovery in the industry’s early history, producers, investors and even 
cities went broke. Even today, the innovation that made the Shale Gale 
possible, resulting in a prodigious increase in U.S. oil production and 
setting records not seen for 40 years, has caused the bankruptcies of scores 
of producers and wrought the destruction of billions of dollars of invested 
capital.  
It can be argued that Schumpeter’s theory is supported by the effect of 
capitalistic competition for unconventional-resource acreage at 
unsustainable costs and the desire to spend beyond cash flow to continually 
increase reserves and boost stock prices. This drive for profit and market 
share created the tsunami of U.S. natural-gas production growth that has 
depressed domestic prices for the foreseeable future. This drive has also 
resulted in a tsunami of U.S. oil production, putting the global market off its 
supply/demand kilter.  
But like prior cycles, contrary to Schumpeter, this is not the final chapter. 
Contrary to theories about the demise of the U.S. oil and gas industry, the 
Shale Gale is emblematic of its reinvention, resurgence and resilience. No 
matter what happens at the surface, the rocks stay the same. The 
hydrocarbons that were formed millions of years ago remain, waiting to be 
produced by new producers with new technology that will make it possible 
to surface oil and gas cheaper and faster. It is only until some disruptive 
technology, supported by capitalistic profit motive—not central planning—
creates the replacement to fuel today’s horse and buggy that hydrocarbons 
will become the institutional deadwood of a new economy.  
Innovation and ingenuity financed by private capital have been the 
hallmark of U.S. independent producers. From the first rudimentary bit, 
pounding rock to reach a shallow oil deposit near Titusville, Pennsylvania, 
more than 150 years ago, the industry has evolved into drilling with 
precision extremely complex wells down thousands of feet below the 
surface, turning 90 degrees and steering the bit another mile or farther 
through hard and dense, hydrocarbon-soaked rock.  
Just two decades ago, this rock had been considered too tight to ever 
produce economic amounts of natural gas. That was disproven in the late 
1990s by Mitchell Energy in the Barnett shale. Being a larger molecule, it 
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was believed that it was impossible to extract economic amounts of oil out 
of tight rock. Lyco Energy Corp. disproved this in 2000 in the Bakken 
formation in Montana.1071  
Through such innovation, the technology has changed, but the spirit and 
drive remains constant. It is the same spirit that drove the early wildcatter to 
spend his—and his banker’s—last dime in search of riches just waiting to 
be discovered. 
With each cycle, capital has been as critical as the producer’s 
determination and his drilling rig. But this capital would never have been as 
readily accessible if not for the investment opportunities created and 
nurtured by a stable U.S. legal and regulatory environment—combined with 
the private ownership of minerals, which has enabled producers to negotiate 
directly with landowners for the permission and encouragement to drill, 
develop and produce oil and gas for the past 150 years.  
Many countries, including many lesser developed, have equal or greater 
mineral wealth, but lack the economic, legal or political environment that is 
attractive to private investment. Many countries have stable economic and 
legal systems, but lack private mineral ownership that facilitates necessary 
local support for private development.1072 
Only in the U.S. has there been the combination of an attractive 
economic environment, private mineral ownership and ready access to 
capital—the oxygen continuously inhaled by oil and gas producers. The 
independents’ insatiable demand for capital has been answered time and 
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again—by early oil capitalists, passive investors ranging from former 
governors to Catholic women’s associations, public shareholders, local 
bankers, mezzanine financiers and private equity, all willing to take a 
calculated risk on an oil and gas wildcatter’s ability to produce a valuable 
prize hidden underground for millennia. 
The cycle repeats with each new wave of producers, bankers and other 
sources of capital. But the producers’ and lenders’ hard-learned lessons 
seemingly must be relearned each time. Perhaps that is the answer: It is not 
until the lessons from the prior circle are forgotten or discounted (“This 
time it’s different”) that the same mistakes can be repeated, beginning the 
cycle anew.   
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